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We investigate the impact of management voluntary disclosure on 
investors’ uncertainty in estimating the risk parameter. Prior theoretical work 
shows that increasing the number of observations related to the cash flow 
generating process can reduce investors’ uncertainty in estimating the risk 
parameter (Barry and Brown 1985). Using variance of beta as our proxy for 
risk parameter uncertainty, we find that risk parameter uncertainty decreases 
in management forecast frequency and management forecast quality. This 
effect is more pronounced for firms in worse information environments, 
firms with higher business uncertainty, firms with younger age, firms with 
more reliable management guidance, and for periods after the enactment of 
Regulation FD. Overall, our findings support prior studies proposing that 
additional information of higher quality reduces estimation risk and suggest 
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Management Forecast and Risk Parameter Uncertainty 
1. Introduction 
The occurrence of “black swan” events in financial market, such as the “flash 
crash” in 2010, has raised great attention to the uncertainty that market 
participants have to face. On Wall Street, “black swan” moments refer to 
periods when investors go panic in response to shocking news that is 
unexpected or difficult to predict. In asset pricing research, estimation risk, or 
parameter uncertainty, is perceived as an additional risk factor that investors 
face when they are estimating unknown parameters of the mean and variance 
of the return- or cash flow-generating process (Klein and Bawa 1976, 1977; 
Clarkson and Thompson 1990; Clarkson, Guedes, and Thompson 1996). 
Although theoretical research demonstrates the impact of information on 
estimation risk and equity pricing (Barry and Brown 1985; Handa and Linn 
1993; Coles, Loewenstein, and Suay 1995), limited empirical evidence has 
been provided on how accounting information affects estimation risk.
1
 The 
purpose of this study is to examine whether and how management voluntary 
disclosure of earnings related information affects estimation risk. 
There are two channels through which accounting information 
influences estimation risk. First, when investors have heterogeneous beliefs 
due to differences in the amount of information available to each investor, 
estimation risk can increase investors’ perceived equity risk and influence the 
equity prices and expected returns (Barry and Brown 1985; Handa and Linn 
1993; Coles et al. 1995). Disclosure of earnings information reduces the 
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divergence of heterogeneous beliefs by mitigating the information asymmetry 
among investors (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; 
Healey and Palepu 2001; Easley and O’Hara 2004). Second, a key input to 
reduce parameter uncertainty is to increase the number of observations related 
to the return or cash flow generating process (Barry and Brown 1985; Coles et 
al. 1995). Voluntary disclosure of accounting information helps increase the 
number of observations about the underlying cash flow or return generating 
process. Besides, not only the quantity but also the quality of the additional 
information helps reduce estimation risk. When management forecast is of 
higher quality, investors’ uncertainty in the estimation process can be reduced 
because of less noise contained in management forecasts. One example of high 
quality information is point forecasts versus range forecasts by management, 
as point forecast is regarded as of less uncertainty (Baginski, Conrad, and 
Hassell 1993). Therefore, we expect that uncertainty about parameter 
estimation decreases in both the quantity and the quality of earnings 
information contained in management voluntary disclosure.  
A simple measure of risk parameter uncertainty is the variance of the 
systematic risk of a firm. Similar to the method in Armstrong, Banerjee, and 
Corona (2013), we estimate our risk parameter uncertainty proxy as variance 
of beta from (log) CAPM model using weekly stock returns. 
We first examine whether firms that issue management forecast have a 
lower level of risk parameter uncertainty, and we find that management 
forecast issuance is negatively associated with investors’ uncertainty in 
estimating risk parameter. We then examine the association between 
management forecast frequency and risk parameter uncertainty.  Management 
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forecast frequency is used as a proxy for information quantity in management 
voluntary disclosure. We find that risk parameter uncertainty is negatively 
associated with management forecast frequency. Besides, we investigate the 
impact of management forecast quality from three aspects, i.e. management 
forecast accuracy, forecast bias, and forecast specificity (precision). We find 
results consistent with our hypothesis that risk parameter uncertainty decreases 
in management forecast quality. 
To understand the cross sectional variation in the relation between 
management forecasts and estimation risk, we examine whether the estimation 
risk reduction effect of management forecasts varies in information 
environment opaqueness. Using firm size, analyst following, and analyst 
forecast dispersion as proxies for information environment, we find that the 
impact of management earnings forecast on risk parameter uncertainty is 
larger for firms in worse information environment. Furthermore, we also find 
that the impact of management forecast on risk parameter uncertainty varies 
with firms’ business uncertainty, firm age, and management forecast reliability. 
Specifically, management forecast has a greater impact on risk parameter 
uncertainty for firms with higher business uncertainty, younger age, and 
higher management forecast reliability. 
In addition, we compare the impact of management forecast properties 
on risk parameter uncertainty in pre- and post-Reg FD period to understand 
whether the role of management forecast in reducing investors’ estimation risk 
has time series variations. Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) is aimed at 
prohibiting firms from disclosing information privately to selected audiences, 
and it causes a structural change in management voluntary disclosure. Results 
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show that management forecast reduces risk parameter uncertainty more 
greatly in post-Reg FD period than in pre-Reg FD period.  
To mitigate potential endogeneity issues between managers’ disclosure 
incentives and estimation risk, we make use of several design choices. First, 
we use a lead-lag regression technique. We measure management forecast 
properties in year t and estimation risk in year t+1. While this reduces 
endogeneity due to reverse causality, it is possible that the same latent variable 
is impacting both management forecasts and estimation risk. Second, we use a 
change regression technique to keep other firm-specific variables constant. 
Third, we identify a sample of CEO turnover events using data from 
Execucomp. CEO turnover is a used as an exogenous shock for the change in 
management forecast properties. We examine the changes in risk parameter 
uncertainty from one year before to one year after CEO turnover and find 
qualitatively consistent evidence that risk parameter uncertainty decreases in 
management forecast frequency and forecast quality. Fourth, to test whether 
reverse causality exists, we conduct a feedback loop test. We find that while 
management forecast can reduce risk parameter uncertainty in the current and 
next year, prior year’s risk parameter uncertainty is not a main driver of 
management forecast properties in current year. Finally, to mitigate the self-
selection bias concern due to the nature of management forecast, we 
implement Heckman two-stage procedure. We estimate the inverse Mills ratio 
from the first stage regression and include it as an additional control variable 
in our main regressions. We find that our results hold after taking accounting 
of selection bias. 
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Roger, Skinner, and Buskirk (2009) examine the impact of voluntary 
disclosure on idiosyncratic risk. Using implied volatility derived from 
exchange-traded option prices as the proxy for idiosyncratic risk, they find that 
the release of management forecast increases short-term implied volatility 
especially when forecasts convey bad news, and conclude that idiosyncratic 
risk increases in management disclosure. While Roger et al. (2009) focus on 
the idiosyncratic volatility, our study mainly focuses on investors’ uncertainty 
in systematic risk estimation. Besides, instead of focusing on management 
disclosure news in an event study, our study aims at exploring to what extent 
management forecast properties affect the dispersion in investors’ perception 
of the risk parameter. 
This study makes the following contributions. First, we contribute to the 
literature on estimation risk. As prior theoretical studies propose that 
information has an impact on investors’ perception of risk (Barry and Brown 
1985; Handa and Linn 1993; Coles et al. 1995), our study investigates whether 
accounting information embedded in voluntary disclosure can explain 
investors’ uncertainty in estimating the underlying distribution of risk. We 
provide direct empirical evidence that earnings information in management 
voluntary disclosure reduces investors’ estimation risk.  
Second, our study contributes to the literature on voluntary disclosure. 
Different from prior research that focuses on short-term market reactions (e.g., 
Coller and John 1997; Roger et al. 2009), we extend the literature by 
examining the impact of management earnings forecast on investors’ risk 
estimation. Besides, as management forecast properties vary because of 
managers’ great discretion in voluntary disclosure, our work shows the impact 
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of different management forecast properties on the market. We provide 
practical implications for market participants. For example, managers can 
have a better insight on the influences of their forecast policy and make the 
optimal decision for their firms. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the 
related literature and develops our main hypotheses. Section 3 describes our 
sample and research design. Results are presented in Section 4 to 7, and we 
conclude in Section 8. 
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.1 The information role of management forecast 
As an important form of voluntary disclosure, management forecasts 
help investors to assess firm risk and alter future expectation by providing 
forward-looking information about a firm’s expected performance. The 
consequences of management forecasts include reducing information 
asymmetry, dealing with firm-specific litigation risk, influencing stock prices 
and market reaction, increasing firm value, and building up managers’ and 
companies’ reputation in transparent reporting (Hirst, Koonce, and 
Venkataraman 2008; Ajinkya and Gift 1984; Clement, Frankel, and Miller 
2003; Trueman 1986; Lee, Matsunaga, and Park 2012; Baginski, Hassell, and 
Kimbrough 2002; Cao and Narayanamoorthy 2011).  Our main focus is on the 
information role of management forecasts.  
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Management forecast is a key source of information to the capital 
market (Lennox and Park 2006). Prior studies have documented that 
management forecast reduces the information asymmetry between managers 
and investors or among investors, and thus reduces the cost of capital 
(Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Easley and O’Hara 2004; Lambert, Leuz, and 
Verrecchia 2007). For example, Coller and Yohn (1997) document that 
management earnings forecast is effective in reducing the information 
asymmetry for a firm’s stock by providing evidence that the bid-ask spreads 
are significantly lower in periods after management forecasts release dates. 
Consistent with the prediction that voluntary disclosure reduces a firm’s cost 
of capital, Li and Zhuang (2012) find that management guidance reduces the 
level of SEO underpricing.  
Besides, firms issue management earnings forecasts to revise investors’ 
expectations about a firm’s future prospect toward management beliefs 
(Ajinkya and Gift 1984; Frankel, McNichols, and Wilson 1995). Using a 
sample of firms with management forecasts that confirm with the preceding 
consensus analyst forecasts, Clement et al. (2003) find that both investors and 
analysts revise their expectations based on information contained in these 
voluntary disclosures, and these voluntary disclosures reduces market 
participants’ uncertainty in future earnings. Related to the role of disclosure in 
reducing estimation risk, prior research concludes that information risk 
increases not only market’s estimation of the variance of cash flows (i.e., 
idiosyncratic risk), but also systematic risk embedded in the estimation of the 
covariance with other firms’ cash flows (Barry and Brown 1985; Lambert et al. 
2007). Supporting evidence can be found in Rajopal and Venkatachalam 
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(2010), who document that higher accounting information quality reduces 
idiosyncratic risk, and in Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and Lafond 
(2009), who show that internal control deficiencies increases both systematic 
risk and idiosyncratic risk.  
2.2 Information and estimation risk 
Estimation risk, or parameter uncertainty, is an additional element of 
risk that investor face because they need to estimate the unknown parameters 
of the mean and variance of the return generating process (Klein and Bawa 
1976, 1977; Clarkson et al. 1996). Estimation risk influences the perceived 
unconditional rate of return distribution.
2
 
Theoretical research suggests that differential information amount 
available to each investors leads to heterogeneity in investors’ beliefs and in 
their predicted risk parameters (Barry and Brown 1985; Handa and Linn 1993; 
Coles et al. 1995). Besides, investors need to estimate the expected payoff 
using various information sources available to them (Kumar, Sorescu, Boehme, 
and Danielsen 2008). When the amount of information available is different 
across securities, investors will face different level of difficulties in estimating 
parameters for each security (Coles et al. 1995). For instance, Handa and Linn 
(1993) document that errors in predicted parameters are larger for assets with 
low information than for assets with high information, and investors estimate a 
higher systematic risk to low information assets than to high information 
assets. In addition, investors can be uncertain about the quality of information 
they obtain (Kumar et al. 2008). As variations in information quality can affect 
                                                     
2
 A partial list of studies in this area includes Klein and Bawa (1976, 1977); Barry and Brown 
(1985); Clarkson and Thompson (1990); Handa and Linn (1993); Cole, Loewenstein, and 
Suay (1995); Clarkson, Guedes, and Thompson (1996). 
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the level of noise in investors’ projection of future cash flows (Lambert et al. 
2007), uncertainty in estimating risk parameter can vary with the quality of 
information used by investors. 
Armstrong et al. (2013) propose a measure of risk parameter uncertainty 
and name it factor loading uncertainty. This measure describes the dispersion 
in investors’ perception of the underlying distribution of the risk. In their study, 
Armstrong et al. (2013) argue that risk factor loading could be uncertain ex 
ante, and the risk factor loading uncertainty can generate additional cross-
sectional variation in expected returns which is not captured by the level of 
risk factor loadings. To support their argument, Armstrong et al. (2013) 
provide empirical evidence that factor loading uncertainty has an impact on 
expected returns after controlling for the level of risk. They further argue that 
firm-specific information can affect expected returns if it has an impact on 
factor loading uncertainty. Building on Armstrong et al. (2013)’s theory of 
factor loading uncertainty, Ni (2014) examines the impact of accounting 
quality on factor loading uncertainty and finds that higher accruals quality is 
associated with lower factor loading uncertainty.  
Although theoretical research propose that information can affect 
investors’ uncertainty in estimating a firm’s risk parameter, limited empirical 
evidence has been provided on how accounting information influences 
investors’ estimation risk.  
2.3 Hypothesis development 
The purpose of our study is to investigate the impact of management 
earnings forecast on investors’ risk parameter uncertainty. Specifically, we 
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argue that management forecast properties influence investors’ uncertainty in 
estimating a firm’s risk parameter, and risk parameter uncertainty decreases in 
the quantity and quality of earnings information contained in management 
voluntary disclosure. 
Theoretical models show that increasing the number of observations in 
the cash flow generating process is an effective way to reduce estimation risk 
(Barry and Brown 1985; Coles et al. 1995). Management earnings forecast 
provides additional information on managers’ beliefs in firms’ expected cash 
flows and reduces information asymmetry among investors (Coller and Yohn 
1997). High frequency of management earnings forecast increases the number 
of observations related to the distribution of expected cash flow, and 
consequently, reduces investors’ uncertainty in estimating a firm’s risk 
parameter.  Thus, our first and second hypothesis are stated as follows. 
H1. Firms that issue management earnings forecast have a lower level 
of risk parameter uncertainty. 
H2. Higher management forecast frequency is associated with lower 
risk parameter uncertainty. 
 
In addition, investors have uncertainty in the quality of information that 
is available to them (Kumar et al. 2008). Lambert et al. (2007) suggest that 
accounting information quality can affect market participants’ projection of 
future cash flows. Given that managers have discretion in voluntary disclosure, 
the quality of information contained in management earnings forecast can 
have cross-sectional variations. Variations in management forecast quality can 
result in differentiation in the level of noise in investors’ projection of 
expected cash flows and thus affect investors’ uncertainty in estimating a 
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firm’s risk parameter. Our second hypothesis is related to the impact of 
management forecast quality and risk parameter uncertainty. 
H3. Management forecast of higher quality is associated with lower risk 
parameter uncertainty. 
 
We investigate the impact of management forecast quality from three 
aspects. First, management forecast accuracy measures the absolute magnitude 
of the difference between management forecast earnings per share and 
reported earnings per share. Theory suggests that worse accounting quality is 
associated with higher level of noise in the projection of future cash flows 
(Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Easley and O’Hara 2004). Accurate 
management forecast contains less noise and helps reduce information 
asymmetry and confirm investors’ expectation of future cash flows. Thus, 
higher level of management forecast accuracy reduces investors’ difficulty in 
estimating the risk parameter from cash flow distribution, while lower level of 
forecast accuracy increases investors’ difficulty in estimating the unknown 
risk parameter. Therefore, we predict that management forecast accuracy 
reduces investors’ uncertainty in estimating a firm’s risk parameter. The 
hypothesis is stated as follows. 
H3a. Risk parameter uncertainty decreases in management forecast 
accuracy. 
 
Second, as management forecast focuses on forwarding-looking 
accounting information, the ability to meet the expectation also matters. Prior 
studies suggest that the market reaction is associated with validated signals 
(Ajinkya and Gift 1984), and the ability to meet the forecast targets helps to 
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verify investors’ beliefs in a firm’s future prospects. Failure in delivering 
promises decreases investors’ confidence in the firm’s future performance and 
increases the dispersion of investors’ opinions. Therefore, our next hypothesis 
is related to the ability to meet management earnings forecast and risk 
parameter uncertainty.  
H3b. Risk parameter uncertainty increases if management forecasted 
target is missed. 
 
Third, management quantitative earnings forecast can either be point 
forecast or range forecast. Point forecast is viewed as forecast with higher 
specificity, while management forecast with larger range is regarded as less 
specific. Management forecast specificity is a reflection of a manager’s beliefs 
in a firm’s future prospect and his/her uncertainty in a firm’s operating 
environment. Prior studies find that stock price reaction to management 
earnings forecast news is associated with management forecast precision 
(Bagniski et al. 1993; Cheng, Luo, and Heng 2013).
3
 Besides, management 
forecast specificity signals the variance of accounting information risk 
contained in management voluntary disclosure. As accounting information 
risk is related to market assessment and the pricing of equity risk (Farrelly, 
Ferris, and Reichenstein 1985; Baginski and Wahlen 2003; Nekrasov and 
Shroff 2009), variance of accounting risk is likely to be associated with the 
variance of return-based equity risk. Therefore, we predict that management 
forecast specificity can help to reduce investors’ uncertainty about a firm’s 
future cash flows, and mitigate the dispersion in investors’ perception of the 
distribution of risk factor. 
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 Here management forecast precision is the same as management forecast specificity. 
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3.1 Sample and data 
We collect our sample of annual management earnings forecast data 
over 1995-2011 from the Company Issued Guidance (CIG) database, which is 
maintained by First Call. We choose this sample period because of the data 
availability from CIG database. We include point forecasts, range forecasts, 
open-ended forecasts, and qualitative forecasts to calculate management 
forecast frequency. For calculation of other management forecast properties, 
we include only point and range forecasts. For range forecasts, we use the 
mid-point of the range as the management forecast number following prior 
research (e.g., Rogers and Stocken 2005; Goodman, Neamtiu, Shroff, and 
White 2014). We exclude forecasts issued after fiscal year end dates following 
prior studies (e.g., Roger and Stoken 2005; Cheng et al. 2013). To calculate 
risk parameter uncertainty measure, we obtain stock return data from Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. Firm fundamentals for 
control variables are collected from Compustat. Analyst forecast data is from 
Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S). We exclude firms in 
financial industry and utility industry following prior research (e.g., Roger and 
Stoken 2005). Table 1 presents the sample selection procedures for 




[Insert Table 1 Here] 
3.2 Measures of management forecast properties 
To examine the association between management forecast and risk 
parameter uncertainty, we adopt five measures of management forecast 
properties following prior studies (e.g., Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough 
2002; Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta 2005; Goodman et al. 2014). Our first 
measure of management forecast, MF, is an indicator variable which equals to 
one if a firm issued at least one management earnings forecast in year t; and 
otherwise zero. Our second management forecast measure is forecast 
frequency, MF_FREQ, which is measured as the number of annual 
management earnings forecasts issued by firm i in year t, and if a firm did not 
issue management forecast, a zero value will be assigned. To assess the quality 
of management earnings forecasts, we first focus on management forecast 
accuracy, ACCURACY, measured as the absolute value of the difference 
between the actual EPS and management forecast EPS, deflated by stock price 
at fiscal year beginning. For firm-years with multiple annual earnings 
forecasts, ACCURACY is measured as the average of forecast accuracy for 
forecasts issued by firm i in that year. We multiply the average forecast 
accuracy by -1 to transform it into an increasing-in-quality measure. Higher 
value of ACCURACY indicates a higher level of management forecast 
accuracy. Our fourth measure of management forecast properties is forecast 
bias, BIAS, measured as the difference between the actual EPS and 
management forecast EPS, deflated by stock price at fiscal year beginning. For 
firm-years with multiple annual management earnings forecasts, BIAS is 
calculated as the average forecast bias for forecasts issued by firm i in that 
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year. If BIAS < 0, management earnings forecast is optimistically biased, 
indicating that firm manager fails to meet the promised target. To measure the 
specificity of management earnings forecast, we use PRECISION, calculated 
as -1 multiply by the difference between the upper- and lower-bound of a 
range forecast, deflated by stock price at fiscal year beginning. We let 
PRECISION equal to zero if management forecast is a point forecast. For 
firm-years with multiple annual management earnings forecasts, PRECISION 
is calculated as the average forecast precision for forecasts issued by firm i in 
that year.
4
 Higher value of PRECISION suggests higher level of specificity. 
3.3 Measure of risk parameter uncertainty 
We use variance of beta as our proxy for investors’ risk parameter 
uncertainty. Our risk parameter uncertainty proxy is estimated using the (log) 
CAPM model as the benchmark pricing model similar to the method used in 
Armstrong et al. (2013). Specifically, we regress weekly excess log return on 
stock i on weekly excess log return on the market over 52 weeks in one year, 
specified as follows. 
                                      ri,t+1 – rf,t = αi + βi(rm,t+1 – rf,t) + εi,t+1                         (1) 
ri,t+1 is weekly log return on stock i; rm,t+1 is weekly log return on the 
market; rf,t is the log risk free rate; εi,t+1 is the error term. βi is the estimate of 
systematic risk factor, and our  risk parameter uncertainty proxy, VBETA, is 
constructed as the squared term of the standard error of  βi estimate. This 
measure captures investors’ uncertainty about a firm’s systematic risk, and 
                                                     
4
 For firms issuing multiple earnings forecasts in a year, we also measure the ACCURACY, 
BIAS, and WIDTH based on the first or last annual management earnings forecast in that year. 
Results remain qualitatively the same. 
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indicates the level of dispersion in investors’ perception of the underlying risk 
in a firm’s future cash flows. A higher value of VBETA indicates a higher level 
of risk parameter uncertainty. 
3.4 Regression specifications 
We estimate the following regression model to examine the impact of 
management forecast on risk parameter uncertainty.  
VBETAi,t+1 = a0 + b1 MEFi,t + b2 LEVi,t + b3 MTBi,t + b4 ROAi,t + b5 
STDROAi,t + b6 LOGMCAPi,t + b7 DISPi,t + ei,t                 (2) 
 
The dependent variable, VBETAi,t+1, is our proxy of risk parameter 
uncertainty for firm i in year t+1. The independent variables, MEFi,t, represent 
our measures of management forecast properties, i.e., management forecast 
indicator (MFi,t), management forecast frequency (MF_FREQi,t), management 
forecast accuracy (ACCURACYi,t), management forecast bias (BIASi,t), and 
management forecast specificity (PRECISIONi,t), for firm i in year t. We use a 
lead-lag regression technique to mitigate the reverse causality concern. b1 is 
expected to be negative when MF is the variable of focus, as we predict that 
firms with management forecast have a lower level of risk parameter 
uncertainty. It is predicted that the higher frequency of management forecast is 
associated with a lower level of risk parameter uncertainty, so we expect b1 < 0 
when the independent variable is management forecast frequency (MF_FREQ). 
For firms with management forecast of higher quality, investors’ uncertainty 
about risk parameter is predicted to be lower. Therefore, when management 
forecast accuracy (ACCURACY) is used as the independent variable, we 
predict b1 < 0. Hypothesis 3b predicts that failure in meeting the management 
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forecast target results in a higher level of risk parameter uncertainty. Thus, we 
expect b1 to be negative if the independent variable is forecast bias (BIAS). 
Finally, for firms with more specific management forecast, investors’ 
uncertainty in estimating risk parameter is lower. As a result, when the 
independent variable is forecast precision (PRECISION), a negative b1 
indicates that specificity in management forecast reduces risk parameter 
uncertainty.  
The control variables include a set of variables that are likely to 
influence risk parameter uncertainty. Specifically, we include leverage (LEV), 
market-to-book ratio (MTB), profitability (ROA), earnings volatility 
(STDROA), firm size (LOGMCAP), and analyst forecast dispersion (DISP) as 
our control variables following Roger et al. (2009) and Rajgopal and 
Venkatachalam (2011), as these variables are documented to influence either 
market uncertainty or idiosyncratic risk. We predict that firms with higher 
leverage are more likely to have higher risk parameter uncertainty because 
high-levered firms are more likely to have financial distress. Firms with 
greater growth opportunities are likely to have higher uncertainty, so we 
predict a positive association between market-to-book ratio and risk parameter 
uncertainty. Larger firms and firms with higher ROA are expected to have 
lower risk parameter uncertainty. Firms with higher earnings volatility are 
likely to have higher operating uncertainty, and thus a higher risk parameter 
uncertainty. Analyst forecast dispersion is expected to be positively associated 
with risk parameter uncertainty. Detailed variable definitions are provided in 
the Appendix. We include year and industry fixed effects, and cluster standard 





4.1 Summary statistics and correlations 
Panel A in Table 2 presents the summary statistics of key variables used 
in our empirical analyses. The sample covers period from 1995 to 2011. Our 
risk parameter uncertainty measure, VBETA, has a mean value of 0.232, and a 
standard deviation of 0.285. Our management forecast frequency measure, 
MF_FREQ, has a mean value of 0.738 and a standard deviation of 1.773. The 
mean value of ACCURACY is -0.036. The mean value of BIAS suggests that 
on average, firms miss their management earnings forecasts by 0.025. The 
mean value of PRECISION is -0.004 and the standard deviation is 0.007. For 
control variables, firms have leverage of 0.211, market-to-book ratio of 3.154, 
return-on-assets of -0.026, earnings volatility of 0.121, log (firm size) of 6.273 
and analyst dispersion of 0.397 on average.  
Panel B presents the mean and median of risk parameter uncertainty for 
firms with and without management earnings forecasts. Results suggests that 
firms that issue management forecasts have significantly lower risk parameter 
uncertainty than firms that do not issue management forecasts. In Panel C of 
Table 2, we report the univariate mean and median of risk parameter 
uncertainty proxy, VBETA, in high and low management forecast quality 
groups. High and low groups are based upon Top and Bottom 30% of 
management forecast quality proxies. Univariate results suggests that VBETA 
is higher for low forecast accuracy group, low forecast bias group, and low 
forecast precision group. The findings are consistent with our predictions.  
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[Insert Table 2 Here] 
Table 3 provides Pearson correlation matrix for our variables of focus. 
The correlation between MF_FREQ and VBETA is -0.15 (p-value < 0.0001), 
suggesting that higher level of management forecast frequency is associated 
with lower level of risk parameter uncertainty. The negative correlation 
between ACCURACY and VBETA (-0.34, p-value < 0.0001) is consistent with 
the prediction that better management forecast quality is associated with lower 
uncertainty in estimating the risk parameter. The correlation between BIAS 
and VBETA is -0.34 (p-value < 0.0001), indicating that failing to meet 
management forecast target is associated with higher risk parameter 
uncertainty. The correlation of -0.25 (p-value < 0.0001) between PRECISION 
and VBETA indicates that the larger the forecast range, the higher the risk 
parameter uncertainty.  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
4.2 Management forecast and risk parameter uncertainty 
Our main results of management forecast properties and risk parameter 
uncertainty are presented in Table 4. Column (1) presents benchmark 
regressions results without management forecast related metrics. Column (2) – 
(6) provide results of management forecast properties and risk parameter 
uncertainty.  
Results in Table 4 are consistent with our predictions. The negative and 
significant coefficient of MF (-0.015, t-value=-5.24) in Column (2) indicates 
that firms with management forecasts issuance have significantly lower risk 
parameter uncertainty. The coefficient of MF_FREQ in Column (3) (-0.002, t-
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value = -2.86) suggests a negative association between management forecast 
frequency and risk parameter uncertainty. The negative coefficients of 
ACCURACY (-0.525, t-value = -5.95) indicates that higher level of 
management forecast accuracy is related to lower risk parameter uncertainty. 
The coefficients of BIAS is -0.533 (t-value = -5.43), which is consistent with 
our prediction that meeting management earnings forecast is associated with 
lower level of uncertainty in risk parameter. The association between 
PRECISION and VBETA is positive and significant, as evidenced by the 
positive coefficients of PRECISION (-2.437, t-value = -3.73). This suggests 
that management forecast specificity reduces risk parameter uncertainty. 
Overall, results in Table 4 indicate that management forecast can reduce 
investors’ uncertainty in estimating the risk parameter, and risk parameter 
uncertainty decreases in management forecast frequency and forecast quality.  
Results for control variables suggest that firms with higher leverage, 
higher market-to-book ratio, higher earnings volatility, or higher analyst 
dispersion have higher risk parameter uncertainty. The positive coefficients of 
ROA and LOGMCAP indicate that more profitable firms and larger firms are 
more likely to have lower risk parameter uncertainty. The associations 
between control variables and risk parameter uncertainty are consistent with 
our expectations. 




5. Additional analyses  
5.1 Management forecast and risk parameter uncertainty – the conditional 
effect of information environment 
In this section, we examine the conditional effect of information 
environment on the association between management forecast and risk 
parameter uncertainty. When investors have limited sources of public 
information about a firm or the information asymmetry is higher among 
market participants, the disclosure of management forecast will have a larger 
impact on the market, and accordingly, the reduction effect of management 
forecast on risk parameter uncertainty should be more pronounced. In our 
analyses, we use three measures to proxy for information environment, i.e. 
firm size, analyst following, and analyst forecast dispersion. We predict that 
the effect of management forecast on risk parameter uncertainty is greater for 
smaller firms and firms with lower analyst following since investors of these 
firms have relatively limited information sources and higher information 
asymmetry. Furthermore, information uncertainty is higher for firms with 
higher analyst forecast dispersion (Zhang 2006). We expect a more 
pronounced effect of management forecast on risk parameter uncertainty for 
firms with higher analyst forecast dispersion.  
To test our prediction, we partition our sample into better and worse 
information environment groups based on our proxies for information 
environment. Specifically, we identify firm-years within Top 30% of firm size 
(LOGMCAP), Top 30% of analyst following (ANAFOLLOW), and Bottom 30% 
of analyst forecast dispersion(DISP) as better information environment groups, 
and firm-years within Bottom 30% of firm size, Bottom 30% of analyst 
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following, and Top 30% of analyst dispersion as worse information 
environment groups, respectively. We lag firm size (LOGMCAP), analyst 
following (ANAFOLLOW) and analyst dispersion (DISP) measures for one 
year to mitigate the concern that analyst characteristics are likely to be 
affected by current management forecasts. 
Results are reported in Table 5. Panel A presents the results of the 
conditional effect of firm size on the association between management 
forecast and risk parameter uncertainty. Consistent with our prediction, the 
impact of management forecast on risk parameter uncertainty is greater for 
smaller firms, as evidenced by larger magnitude of the coefficients of MF, 
MF_FREQ, ACCURACY, BIAS, and PRECISION for smaller firms than those 
for larger firms. In general, F-test suggests that the differences are statistically 
significant (MF: -0.017 < -0.015, Chi
2
 = 0.21; MF_FREQ: -0.005 < -0.002, 
Chi
2
 = 2.14; ACCURACY: -0.237 < -0.030, Chi
2
 = 16.35; BIAS: -0.238 < -
0.079, Chi
2
 = 8.03; PRECISION: -1.831 < -0.611, Chi
2
 = 3.40). In Panel B, we 
report the comparison between low and high analyst following groups and find 
that the association between management forecast properties and risk 
parameter uncertainty is stronger for firms with lower analyst following (MF: 
-0.038 < -0.012, Chi
2 
= 12.38; MF_FREQ: -0.010 < -0.001, Chi
2
 = 24.57; 
ACCURACY: -0.232 < -0.136, Chi
2
 = 2.28; BIAS: -0.254 < -0.202, Chi
2
 = 0.55; 
PRECISION: -1.504 < -0.722, Chi
2
 = 3.35). As for the conditional effect of 
analyst dispersion on the association between management forecast and risk 
parameter uncertainty, evidence in Panel C suggests that when analyst 
dispersion is higher, the impact of management forecast on risk parameter 
uncertainty is more pronounced (MF: -0.013 < -0.004, Chi
2
 = 3.72; MF_FREQ: 
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-0.002 < -0.000, Chi
2
 = 1.68; BIAS: -0.229 < -0.022, Chi
2 
= 2.47). For high 
analyst dispersion group, the association between management forecast 
accuracy and risk parameter uncertainty is negative and significant (-0.158, t-
value = -4.01), whereas for the low analyst dispersion group, the association is 
insignificantly negative (-0.213, t-value = -1.60). The coefficient of 
PRECISION for high dispersion group is significant and negative (-1.424, t-
value = -2.31), whereas the coefficient of PRECISION for low dispersion 
group is negative and insignificant (-1.764, t-value =-1.58). Overall, results in 
Table 5 are consistent with our expectation that the impact of management 
forecast on risk parameter uncertainty is more pronounced for firms with 
worse information environment.   
 [Insert Table 5 here] 
5.2 Management forecast and risk parameter uncertainty – the conditional 
effect of firm’s business uncertainty 
We also examine whether business environment firms operate in affects 
the association between management forecast and risk parameter uncertainty. 
It is difficult for investors to make predictions when firms operate in business 
environment with high uncertainty. It is of greater help if managers can 
provide additional and higher quality information on firms’ future prospects. 
We predict that when business uncertainty is higher, management forecast is 
more effective in reducing investors’ uncertainty in estimating risk parameter.   
We use earnings volatility, STDROA, as our proxy for business 
uncertainty, and identify high and low business uncertainty subsamples based 
on Top and Bottom 30% of STDROA lagged by one year. Results are 
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presented in Table 6. We find that the association between management 
forecast and risk parameter uncertainty is significantly negative for high 
business uncertainty groups and insignificantly negative for low business 
uncertainty groups when MF, MF_FREQ, ACCURACY, and BIAS are used as 
management forecast proxies. When PRECISION is used as the proxy for 
management forecast quality, we find impact of management forecast 
precision on risk parameter uncertainty is insignificantly different between 
high and low business uncertainty groups. Overall, results in Table 6 indicate 
that when business uncertainty is higher, the impact of management forecast 
on risk parameter uncertainty is more pronounced.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
5.3 Management forecast and risk parameter uncertainty – the conditional 
effect of firm age 
As risk parameter uncertainty decreases in the number of observations 
related to return generating process (Barry and Brown 1985), investors may 
face less difficulty in estimating risk when there is more historical information 
available. Using firm age as a proxy for number of historical observations, we 
predict that the impact of management voluntary disclosure on investors’ 
estimation risk is more pronounced for young firms than for old firms, as 
young firms have less historical information available.  
In Table 7, we identify young and old firms based upon Bottom and Top 
30% of firm age, and compare the coefficients of management forecast metrics 
between young and old firms. In general, we find that risk parameter 
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uncertainty decreases in management forecast accuracy and management 
forecast bias to a greater extent for young firms than for old firms. 
 [Insert Table 7 here] 
5.4 Management forecast and risk parameter uncertainty – the conditional 
effect of management forecast reliability 
The usefulness of management forecast in assisting with risk estimation 
may also depend on the reliability of management forecast. To test whether 
management forecast reliability has a role in the reduction impact of 
management forecast on investors’ estimation risk, we calculate the 
correlation between management forecast earnings and realized future 
earnings by year, and identify subsamples of firms with high and low 
correlation. High correlation group consists of firms with more reliable 
forecasts, whereas low correlation group contains firms with less reliable 
forecasts.  
Results in Table 8 suggest that when the correlation between 
management forecast earnings and realized future earnings is higher, 
improvement in management forecast quality (ACCURACY, BIAS) is more 
effective in reducing investors’ uncertainty in estimating risk.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
5.5 Management forecast and risk parameter uncertainty – the effect of Reg 
FD 
The above section provides cross-sectional evidence of the conditional 
effect of information environment on the association between management 
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forecast and risk parameter uncertainty. In this section, we are interested in 
whether the impact of management forecast on risk parameter uncertainty 
varies inter-temporally. Therefore, we investigate whether implementation of 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) influences the association between 
management forecast and risk parameter uncertainty. Reg FD prohibits 
managers to privately disclose information to selected investors and analysts. 
Prior research documents that the informativeness of management earnings 
forecasts has increased in post-Reg FD period (Heflin, Kross, and Suk 2012; 
2015). Therefore, we expect that the impact of management forecast on risk 
parameter uncertainty is greater in post-Reg FD period.  
Since the enactment of Reg FD was in 2000, we split our sample periods 
into pre- and post-Reg FD periods according the enactment year. Specifically, 
our pre-Reg FD periods include sample years from 1995 to 1999, and our 
post-Reg FD periods include sample years from 2001 to 2011. Comparing 
results in pre- and post-Reg FD periods, we find that the coefficients of MF, 
MF_FREQ, ACCURACY, and BIAS are significantly more negative in post-
Reg FD sample, and the coefficient of PRECISION is negative and significant 
in post-Reg FD period, while the coefficient of PRECISION in pre-Reg FD 
period is positive and significant. The results in Table 9 are generally 
consistent with our expectation that the impact of management forecast 
properties on risk parameter uncertainty is more pronounced after the 
implementation of Reg FD. 




6. Endogeneity issues 
6.1 Changes specification 
One possible endogeneity concern is that unobservable time-invariant 
variables may affect both management forecast properties and risk parameter 
uncertainty. To mitigate this concern, we perform change analyses to keep 
other firm-level variables constant and examine the association between 
changes in management forecast properties and changes in investors’ 
uncertainty in estimating risk parameter. The specification is as follows. 
∆VBETAi,t = a0 + b1 ∆MEFi,t + b2 ∆LEVi,t + b3 ∆MTBi,t + b4 ∆ROAi,t      
+ b5 ∆STDROAi,t  + b6 ∆LOGMCAPi,t + b7 ∆DISPi,t + ei,t  (3) 
∆VBETA is the change in risk parameter uncertainty over two 
consecutive years; ∆MEF is the change in management forecast properties 
over two consecutive years, including ∆MF_FREQ, ∆ACCURACY, ∆BIAS, 
and ∆PRECISION. Control variables include changes in leverage (∆LEV), 
changes in market-to-book ratio (∆MTB), changes in profitability (∆ROA), 
changes in earnings volatility (∆STDROA), changes in market capitalization 
(∆LOGMCAP), and changes in analyst dispersion (∆DISP).  
Table 10 provides results for the change regression. The coefficient of 
∆MF_FREQ is negative and significant at 1% level (-0.003, t-value = -4.74), 
suggesting that increases in the frequency of management earnings forecasts 
reduces investors’ uncertainty in risk parameter. The negative and significant 
coefficient of ∆ACCURACY (-0.134, t-value = -3.18) indicates that 
improvement in management forecast accuracy has a subsequent reduction 
effect on risk parameter uncertainty. When manager’s ability to meet 
management forecast increases, risk parameter uncertainty decreases 
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accordingly, as evidenced by the negative and significant coefficient of ∆BIAS 
(-0.126, t-value = -3.33). The positive and significant coefficient of 
∆PRECISION (-0.888, t-value = -1.90) provides evidence that increases in 
specificity of management forecast reduces risk parameter uncertainty. 
Change regression results support our main hypotheses that management 
forecast is effective in reducing investors’ risk parameter uncertainty. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
6.2 Management forecast and risk parameter uncertainty – CEO turnover 
sample 
Another possible concern is about the managers’ incentives to issue 
management earnings forecasts. Some may argue that reverse causality might 
exist between risk parameter uncertainty and management forecast properties. 
To deal with this concern, we identify a sample of firm-years that experienced 
CEO turnover, and use the CEO turnover setting as an exogenous event for the 
changes in management forecast properties. Prior studies find that managers 
with different styles influence voluntary disclosure differently (Bamber, Jiang, 
and Wang 2010; Baik, Farber, and Lee 2011). One reason for CEO turnover is 
poor managerial ability, as evidenced by higher management forecast errors 
prior to turnover (Lee et al. 2012). Therefore, changes in management forecast 
properties arising from CEO turnover are exogenous and not affected by risk 
parameter uncertainty in prior periods. Based on the CEO turnover setting, we 
examine the subsequent effect of the changes in management forecast 
properties from one year before to one year after turnover year on changes in 
risk parameter uncertainty around the CEO turnover event. Using data from 
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Execucomp, we identify a CEO turnover sample and estimate the following 
regression model. 
∆VBETAi,t = a0 + b1 ∆MEFi,t + b2 ∆LEVi,t + b3 ∆MTBi,t + b4 ∆ROAi,t      
+ b5 ∆STDROAi,t  + b6 ∆LOGMCAPi,t + b7 ∆DISPi,t + ei,t  (4) 
∆VBETA is the change in risk parameter uncertainty from year t-1 to 
year t+1; ∆MEF is change in management forecast properties from year t-1 to 
year t+1, including ∆FREQ, ∆ACCURACY, ∆BIAS, and ∆PRECISION. Year t 
is the event year, i.e. the CEO turnover year. Control variables include 
changes in leverage (∆LEV), changes in market-to-book ratio (∆MTB), 
changes in profitability (∆ROA), changes in earnings volatility (∆STDROA), 
changes in market capitalization (∆LOGMCAP), and changes in analyst 
dispersion (∆DISP), from one year prior to CEO turnover year to one year 
after CEO turnover year.  
We report the results for CEO turnover sample in Table 11. The 
coefficient of ∆ACCURACY is negative and significant (-0.477, t-value = -
1.68), which indicates that improvement in management forecast accuracy due 
to change of managers has a subsequent reduction effect on risk parameter 
uncertainty. As for the changes in management forecast bias, results suggest 
that improvement in the ability to meet management forecasts significantly 
reduces risk parameter uncertainty (-0.250, t-value = -2.03). The coefficient of 
∆PRECISION is positive and significant (-1.977, t-value = -1.65), which is 
consistent with our expectation. The negative coefficient of ∆MF_FREQ (-
0.002, t-value = -1.15) suggests that the increased frequency of management 
forecasts by new managers reduces investors’ uncertainty in estimating risk 
parameter. The insignificance of ∆MF_FREQ may due to small sample size. 
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[Insert Table 11 here] 
6.3 Test of feedback loop 
While this study argues that management forecast affects risk parameter 
uncertainty, potential reverse causality concern is that management voluntary 
disclosure may be affected by risk parameter uncertainty in prior period. To 
test whether a feedback loop exists between management forecast and risk 
parameter uncertainty, we estimate the following regression model. 
MEFi,t = a0 + b1VBETAi,t+1 + b2VBETA i,t + b3VBETA i,t-1 + ei,t          (5) 
If management forecast is affected by investors’ risk parameter 
uncertainty in prior period, a higher level of current risk parameter uncertainty 
would lead to a higher level of management forecast quantity and quality in 
the future. Therefore, if feedback loop exists, a positive b3 is expected. 
Table 12 presents the results of feedback loop test. When dependent 
variables are MFi,t or MF_FREQi,t, we find that the coefficients of VBETAi,t-1 
are negative, which suggest that firms issue forecast not due to high risk 
parameter uncertainty in prior year. The coefficients of VBETAi,t-1 when 
dependent variable is ACCURACYi,t, or PRECISIONi,t indicate that prior 
year’s risk parameter uncertainty is not the driven force of changes in 
management forecast quality. The coefficients of VBETAi,t+1 suggest that risk 
parameter uncertainty can be reduced by increasing management forecast 
issuance and improving management forecast quality. Overall, results suggest 
that feedback loop does not exist between management forecast and risk 
parameter uncertainty. 
 [Insert Table 12 here] 
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6.4 Selection bias 
To mitigate this concern of the endogenous nature of management 
earnings forecasts, we implement Heckman two-stage procedure to correct for 
potential self-selection bias. In the first stage, we model management forecast 
issuance decision as a function of factors that are associated with management 
voluntary disclosure decisions following prior studies (Lennox and Park 2006; 
Gong et al. 2009). Specifically, we estimate the following probit model to 
predict the likelihood of management forecast issuance. 
Pr(MFi,t+1=1) = a0 + b1 MTBi,t + b2 LEVi,t + b3 ROAi,t + b4 STDROAi,t       
+ b5 LOGMCAPi,t + b6 Log(ANAFOLLOW) i,t                    
+ b7 DISPi,t + b8 LITIGATIONi,t + ei,t                            (6) 
Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. Based on the first-
stage regression in Eq. (6), we estimate the inverse Mills ratio (InvMills) and 
include it as an additional control variable in our main regressions. Thus, the 
second-stage regression model is as follows.  
VBETAi,t+1 = a0 + b1 MEFi,t + b2 LEVi,t + b3 MTBi,t + b4 ROAi,t                    
+ b5 STDROAi,t + b6 LOGMCAPi,t + b7 DISPi,t                      
+ b8InvMillsi,t + ei,t                                                             (7) 
Table 13 provides results of first-stage and second-stage regressions. In 
Panel A, we present the regression results of first-stage regression. We find 
that the decision to issue management earnings forecast is negatively related to 
market-to-book ratio (MTB), earnings variability (STDROA), analyst forecast 
dispersion (DISP), and litigation risk (LITIGATION), and positively associated 
with leverage (LEV), profitability (ROA), firm size (LOGMCAP), and analyst 
coverage (ANAFOLLOW). Panel B reports results of the impact of 
management earnings forecast on risk parameter uncertainty controlling for 
the inverse Mills ratio (InvMills) from the first-stage regression. We find 
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results consistent with our main hypotheses that management forecast quantity 
and management forecast quality can reduce investors’ uncertainty in 
estimating the risk parameters. 
[Insert Table 13 here] 
 
7. Robustness checks 
7.1 Alternative measures of risk parameter uncertainty 
Our dependent variable is squared term of standard error of beta 
estimates from CAPM model. In this section, we test the robustness of our 
findings with alternative measures of risk parameter uncertainty.  
7.1.1 Alternative beta-based risk parameter uncertainty measure 
Our alternative beta-based risk parameter uncertainty measure, 
VBETA_VAR, is estimated as follows. We first randomly select 30 weekly 
return observations from the 52 weekly returns for firm i in year t and get the 
beta estimate from CAPM model. Then we repeat this procedure for 30 times 
so that we have 30 beta estimates for firm i in year t.
5
 VBETA_VAR is 
estimated as the squared term of standard deviation of beta estimates.   
We examine the impact of management forecast on investors’ estimation 
risk using the above alternative beta-based risk parameter uncertainty measure. 
In Panel A Table 14, we find results consistent with our hypotheses. 
Specifically, we find that issuance of management forecast is effective in 
                                                     
5
 We also repeat the random selection and estimation procedure for 100 times, and get 
qualitatively similar results.  
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reducing investors’ uncertainty in estimating risk parameter uncertainty and 
risk parameter uncertainty is negatively associated with both information 
quantity and quality in management forecast.   
7.1.2 Risk parameter uncertainty based on Fama-French three-factor model 
While our main analyses focus on investors’ uncertainty in estimating 
market beta, in this section, we examine whether our results are robust to 
estimation risk measures related to risk factors other than market risk. 
Specifically, we estimate investors’ uncertainty in estimating size factor and 
book-to-market factor based on Fama-French three-factor model (Fama and 
French 1992; 1993), and test the impact of management forecast on size-
factor- and book-to-market-factor-based risk parameter uncertainty. 
Size-factor-based risk parameter uncertainty (VBETA_SMB) and book-
to-market-based risk parameter uncertainty (VBETA_HML) are estimated from 
Fama-French three-factor model using weekly returns in a year. 
ri,t+1 – rf,t = αi + βi(rm,t+1 – rf,t) + βsSMB + βvHML + εi,t+1                    (8) 
VBETA_SMB (VBETA_HML) is the squared term of the standard error 
of βs (βv) estimates. A higher value of VBETA_SMB (VBETA_HML) indicates 
a higher level of investors’ uncertainty in estimating risk related to size (book-
to-market) factor. 
Results are presented in Panel B and C, Table 14. In Panel B, we find 
that size-factor-based risk parameter uncertainty is lower for firms with 
management forecasts, and it decreases in management forecast frequency and 
management forecast quality. This is consistent with the findings based on 
beta-based risk parameter uncertainty. Panel C shows results of book-to-
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market-factor-based risk parameter uncertainty. Similarly, we find that 
compared with firms without management forecast, firms that issue 
management forecast have a lower level of risk parameter uncertainty. When 
management forecast quality is higher, estimation risk related to book-to-
market factor is lower.  
 [Insert Table 14 here] 
7.2 Alternative proxy for management forecast frequency 
In our main analyses, we use the number of annual management forecast 
as our proxy for management forecast frequency. For robustness check, we 
use an alternative measure of management forecast frequency, FREQ_RATIO, 
to test our second hypothesis. FREQ_RATIO is measured as the management 
forecast frequency deflated by average forecast frequency over the prior 3 
years.  
VBETAi,t+1 = a0 + b1 FREQ_RATIOi,t + b2 LEVi,t + b3 MTBi,t + b4 ROAi,t                       
+ b5 STDROAi,t + b6 LOGMCAPi,t + b7 DISPi,t + ei,t         (9) 
Results in Table 15 show that our alternative forecast frequency proxy is 
negatively associated with risk parameter uncertainty (-0.022, t-value = -2.96), 
which supports our argument that investors’ uncertainty in estimating risk 
parameter decreases in management forecast frequency.   
 [Insert Table 15 here] 
7.3 Missing management forecast and risk parameter uncertainty 
We predict that risk parameter uncertainty is higher if a firm misses the 
manager’s forecast target. In the main analyses, we use management forecast 
bias as a proxy for the ability to meet management earnings forecast. To check 
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the robustness of our results regarding to this hypothesis, in this section we use 
an indicator variable MISS as our independent variable.  
VBETAi,t+1 = a0 + b1 MISSi,t + b2 LEVi,t + b3 MTBi,t + b4 ROAi,t + b5 
STDROAi,t + b6 LOGMCAPi,t + b7 DISPi,t + ei,t               (10) 
  MISS is an indicator variable that equals one if actual earning is lower 
than management forecast earning; and zero otherwise. We expect the 
coefficient of MISS to be positive.  
In Table 16, we report the results of the association between missing 
management forecast and risk parameter uncertainty. Coefficient of MISS is 
positive and significant (0.009, t-value = 2.84), indicating that if management 
earnings forecast is missed, risk parameter uncertainty is higher. Overall, the 
result in Table 16 is consistent with our hypothesis.  
[Insert Table 16 here] 
7.4 Analyses based on truncated and tobit model 
Since our dependent variable, VBETA, is truncated at zero, we test our 
hypotheses using truncated model and tobit model for robustness checks. 
Results in Table 17 support our arguments on the impact of management 
forecast on investors’ risk parameter uncertainty.  
[Insert Table 17 here] 
7.5 Analyses based on I/B/E/S guidance data 
Our main sample covers years from 1995 to 2011 because of data 
availability from First Call CIG database. We test the robustness of our 
findings using management guidance data from I/B/E/S guidance so that 
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sample years can be extended to 2015. We find consistent results that support 
our arguments.  
 [Insert Table 18 here] 
7.6 Risk parameter uncertainty estimated by excluding weekly returns 
around earnings announcements 
To test the robustness of our results and mitigate the concern that more 
and more management forecasts are bundled with earnings announcements, 
we re-calculate our risk parameter uncertainty proxy by removing weekly 
returns around earnings announcements. Results are presented in Table 19. We 
find that our results are robust and consistent with our hypotheses. 
[Insert Table 19 here] 
7.7 Management forecast properties calculated using both annual and 
quarterly management earnings forecast 
In our main analyses, our management forecast properties are calculated 
based on annual management earnings forecast. As firms can issue either 
annual or quarterly forecast, we re-calculate management forecast properties 
using both annual and quarterly management earnings forecast as a robustness 
check. Results in Table 20 are consistent with our main hypotheses that 
management forecast quantity and quality are effective in reducing risk 
parameter uncertainty. 
[Insert Table 20 here] 
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7.8 Inclusion of Open-ended forecasts for management forecast quality 
In the main analyses, we only include point and range forecast to 
calculate our measures of management forecast accuracy and management 
forecast bias. Following Anilowski, Feng, and Skinner (2007), we include 
open-ended forecast and use the minimum or maximum value as the 
management forecast number when calculating management forecast accuracy 
and bias. We present results in Table 21. We find results robust and consistent 
with our argument that risk parameter uncertainty decreases in management 
forecast quality. 
[Insert Table 21 here] 
7.9 Upper bound as management forecast number 
When management forecast is range forecast, we use the midpoint as 
management forecast value. Ciconte, Kirk, and Tucker (2014) document that 
managers’ true earnings forecasts are close to the upper bound of range 
forecast from 1995 to 2010, and the upper bound better represents investors’ 
interpretation of managers’ forecast. Therefore, we use upper bound of range 
forecast as management forecast number for robustness check. We find that 
our results still hold using upper bound instead of midpoint of range forecast.  
[Insert Table 22 here] 
 
8. Conclusion 
The association between information and investors’ uncertainty in 
estimating risk parameter is one of the fundamental issues in asset pricing 
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research. Investors rely on disclosed information to estimate the unknown risk 
parameters related to the future cash flow generating process, and theoretical 
work demonstrates that increasing the information amount can reduce 
investors’ uncertainty in estimating the risk parameter (Barry and Brown 1985; 
Handa and Linn 1993; Coles et al. 1995). Using the variance of beta as a 
proxy for risk parameter uncertainty, in this paper, we aim at exploring how 
management voluntary disclosures affect investors’ uncertainty in estimating a 
firm’s risk parameter. 
We estimate the risk parameter uncertainty proxy based on (log) CAPM 
model using weekly returns, and examine five properties of management 
voluntary disclosure, i.e. management earnings forecast issuance, forecast 
frequency, forecast accuracy, forecast bias, and forecast specificity. We find 
that management earnings forecasts issuance reduces risk parameter 
uncertainty, and risk parameter uncertainty decreases in both the quantity and 
quality of management earnings forecast. In addition, the impact of 
management forecast on risk parameter uncertainty is more pronounced for 
firms with worse information environment, firms with higher business 
uncertainty, firms with younger age, and firms with more reliable management 
forecast. Furthermore, the role of management forecast in reducing risk 
parameter uncertainty is stronger after the enactment of Reg FD.  
To mitigate the potential endogenous management incentives concerns, 
we conduct a lead-lag regression analyses, change regression analyses, and 
identify a sample of CEO turnover firm-years as exogenous events. We find 
confirming evidence that management voluntary disclosure reduces risk 
parameter uncertainty. Besides, the feedback loop test suggests that while 
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management forecast is effective in reducing investors’ estimation risk, 
reducing investors’ estimation risk is not the main determinant of management 
forecast. Overall, our study suggests that risk parameter uncertainty varies 
with voluntary disclosure characteristics, and management voluntary 
disclosure is one factor that affects investors’ uncertainty in estimating a 
firm’s risk parameter.  
Our study fits into the line of research on estimation risk. We provide 
direct empirical evidence for researchers that investors’ uncertainty in 
estimating a firm’s risk can be affected by firm-specific information. In 
addition, we contribute to literature on management forecast by showing that 
reducing investors’ estimation risk is another capital market benefit of 
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Risk parameter uncertainty, measured as the squared term of the 
standard error of the beta estimate from the log(CAPM) model using 
weekly returns in year t 
 
MF An indicator variable that equals to one if firm i issued management 
earnings forecast in year t; and zero otherwise  
 
MF_FREQ Number of annual management forecast firm i issued in year t; and if 
firm i issued no forecast in year t, MF_FREQ equals to zero 
 
BIAS Average bias in forecasts firm i issued in year t, measured as difference 
between actual EPS and forecasted EPS, scaled by share price at fiscal 
year beginning 
 
ACCURACY Average forecast accuracy for firm i in year t, where forecast accuracy 
is measured as absolute value of the difference between forecast EPS 
and actual EPS, scaled by share price at fiscal year beginning; 
Accuracy is multiplied by -1 to transform it in an increasing-in-quality 
measure 
 
PRECISION -1 multiply by average forecast range of firm i in year t, where forecast 
range is the difference between upper bound and lower bound of 
management forecast, deflated by stock price at fiscal year beginning 
 
LEV Leverage ratio, calculated as long-term debt divided by total assets 
 
MTB Market to book ratio 
 
ROA Operating profitability, calculated as income before extraordinary item 
divided by total assets 
 
STDROA Earnings volatility, calculated as standard deviation of ROA for prior 5 
years 
 
LOGMCAP Log of market capitalization 
 
ANAFOLLOW Number of analyst following firm i in year t 
 
DISP Analyst earnings forecast dispersion for firm i in year t 
 
LITIGATION An indicator variable that equals to one if firm i is in the biotechnology 
(SIC: 2833-2836 and 8731-8734), computers (SIC: 3570-3577 and 
7370-7374), electronics (SIC: 3600-3674), and retail (SIC: 5200-5961) 









Table 1: Sample selection  
This table presents the sample selection procedure for management forecast frequency sample 
and management forecast quality sample. The sample period is from 1995 to 2011. Panel A 
reports the sample selection procedure for management forecast quantity sample; Panel B 
reports the sample selection procedure for management forecast quality sample. 
 
Panel A: Management forecast quantity sample 
 
MF/MF_FREQ 
Annual management earnings forecast for fiscal years 1995-2011 60,083 
  Less: management forecasts issued after fiscal year end (6,020) 
 
54,063 
Representing firm-years with management forecast 15,149 
Pool sample including firm-years without management forecast 125,735 
  Less: firm-years with missing control variables during 1994-2010 (59,217) 




Panel B: Management forecast quality sample 
 
ACCURACY/BIAS SPECIFICITY 












Representing firm-years 15,149 
 
15,149 
Less: firm-years without stock price information (358) 
 
(358) 
Less: firm-years without point and range forecast (1,252) 
 
(1,252) 
Firm-years with point and range forecasts 13,539 
 
13,539 
Less: firm-years with missing actual earnings 
information (25)   
Less: firm-years with missing control variables 
during 1994-2010 (980) 
 
(980) 


















Table 2: Summary statistics for key variables 
This table reports descriptive statistics of key variables used in the regression analyses. The 
sample ranges from 1995 to 2011. Panel A reports the summary statistics for key variables for 
full sample; Panel B reports the univariate mean and median of risk parameter uncertainty for 
firms with and without management earnings forecasts; Panel C reports the univariate mean 
and median of risk parameter uncertainty proxy in low and high management forecast quality 
groups, where high and low groups are based on Top and Bottom 30% of management 
forecast quality proxies. VBETA is our proxy for risk parameter uncertainty, measured as the 
squared term of the standard error of the beta estimate from the (log) CAPM model using 
weekly returns in year t; MF is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if firm i issued forecast in 
year t; otherwise zero; MF_FREQ is the number of annual management forecast firm i issued 
in year t, and if firm i issued no forecast in year t, MF_FREQ equals zero; ACCURACY is 
average forecast accuracy for firm i in year t, where forecast accuracy is calculated as absolute 
value of the difference between actual EPS and forecast EPS, scaled by share price at fiscal 
year beginning; ACCURACY is multiplied by -1 to transform it in an increasing-in-quality 
measure; BIAS is average bias in management earnings forecasts for firm i in year t, where 
bias is measured as difference between actual EPS and forecasted EPS, scaled by share price 
at fiscal year beginning; PRECISION is -1 multiply by average forecast range of firm i in year 
t, where forecast range is the difference between upper bound and lower bound of 
management earnings forecast, deflated by stock price at fiscal year beginning; LEV is 
calculated as long-term debt divided by total assets; MTB is market-to-book ratio, calculated 
as market capitalization divided by book value of equity; ROA is measured as income before 
extraordinary items divided by total assets; STDROA is the standard deviation of ROA for 
prior 5 years; LOGMCAP is calculated as natural log of market capitalization; DISP is analyst 
forecast dispersion. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics for full sample 
  N Mean SD Q1 Median Q3 
VBETA 52,077 0.232 0.285 0.063 0.133 0.281 
MF_FREQ 52,077 0.738 1.773 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ACCURACY 10,202 -0.036 0.110 -0.026 -0.009 -0.003 
BIAS 10,202 -0.025 0.089 -0.023 -0.003 0.002 
PRECISION 10,226 -0.004 0.007 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 
LEV 52,077 0.211 0.209 0.013 0.170 0.338 
MTB 52,077 3.154 4.423 1.314 2.193 3.768 
ROA 52,077 -0.026 0.225 -0.031 0.037 0.080 
STDROA 52,077 0.121 0.203 0.024 0.051 0.123 
LOGMCAP 52,077 6.273 1.877 4.935 6.138 7.440 
DISP 52,077 0.397 1.326 0.047 0.108 0.253 
 
Panel B: Risk parameter uncertainty for non-forecast vs. forecast groups 
  MF=0   MF=1   Diff. in 
mean 
t-value 
  N Mean Median 
 
N Mean Median 
 




Panel C: Risk parameter uncertainty in low vs. high management forecast 
quality groups 
  Low   High   Diff. in 
mean 
t-value 
  N Mean Median 
 
N Mean Median 
 
ACCURACY 3,060 0.185 0.108 
 





BIAS 3,060 0.177 0.105 
 










Table 3: Pearson correlations of key variables 
This table presents the Pearson correlations among key variables in the regression analyses. VBETA is our proxy for risk parameter uncertainty, measured as 
the squared term of the standard error of the beta estimate from the (log) CAPM model using weekly returns in year t; MF_FREQ is the number of annual 
management forecast firm i issued in year t, and if firm i issued no forecast in year t, MF_FREQ equals zero; ACCURACY is average forecast accuracy for 
firm i in year t, where forecast accuracy is calculated as absolute value of the difference between actual EPS and forecast EPS, scaled by share price at 
fiscal year end; ACCURACY is average forecast accuracy for firm i in year t, where forecast accuracy is calculated as absolute value of the difference 
between actual EPS and forecast EPS, scaled by share price at fiscal year beginning; ACCURACY is multiplied by -1 to transform it in an increasing-in-
quality measure; BIAS is average bias in management earnings forecasts for firm i in year t, where bias is measured as difference between actual EPS and 
forecasted EPS, scaled by share price at fiscal year beginning; PRECISION is -1 multiply by average forecast range of firm i in year t, where forecast range 
is the difference between upper bound and lower bound of management earnings forecast, deflated by stock price at fiscal year beginning; LEV is calculated 
as long-term debt divided by total assets; MTB is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market capitalization divided by book value of equity; ROA is 
measured as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; STDROA is the standard deviation of ROA for prior 5 years; LOGMCAP is 
calculated as natural log of market capitalization; DISP is analyst forecast dispersion. 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VBETA (1) 1                   
           MF_FREQ (2) -0.15 
         
 
(<.0001) 
         
ACCURACY (3) -0.34 0.09 
        
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) 
        
BIAS (4) -0.34 0.10 0.86 
       
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
       
PRECISION (5) -0.25 0.04 0.43 0.43 
      
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
      
LEV (6) -0.02 0.02 -0.11 -0.10 -0.09 
     
 
(<.0001) (0.00) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
     
MTB (7) 0.03 0.01 0.10 0.10 0.18 -0.10 
    
 
(<.0001) (0.00) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
    
ROA (8) -0.41 0.13 0.48 0.48 0.41 -0.02 0.00 
   
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.35) 
   
STDROA (9) 0.33 -0.12 -0.21 -0.17 -0.16 -0.13 0.11 -0.53 
  
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
  
LOGMCAP (10) -0.41 0.24 0.27 0.27 0.36 0.06 0.18 0.36 -0.26 
 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 
DISP (11) 0.16 -0.07 -0.41 -0.36 -0.23 0.04 -0.01 -0.24 0.14 -0.09 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.01) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
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Table 4: Management forecast and risk parameter uncertainty 
This table presents the results of the association between management forecast and risk 
parameter uncertainty. The sample ranges from 1995 to 2011. The dependent variable is 
VBETA, our proxy for risk parameter uncertainty, estimated from CAPM using weekly returns 
over year t+1. MF is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if firm i issued forecast in year t; 
otherwise zero; MF_FREQ is the number of annual management forecast firm i issued in year 
t; ACCURACY is average forecast accuracy for firm i in year t, where forecast accuracy is 
calculated as absolute value of the difference between actual EPS and forecast EPS, scaled by 
share price at fiscal year end; ACCURACY is average forecast accuracy for firm i in year t, 
where forecast accuracy is calculated as absolute value of the difference between actual EPS 
and forecast EPS, scaled by share price at fiscal year beginning; ACCURACY is multiplied by 
-1 to transform it in an increasing-in-quality measure; BIAS is average bias in management 
earnings forecasts for firm i in year t, where bias is measured as difference between actual 
EPS and forecasted EPS, scaled by share price at fiscal year beginning; PRECISION is -1 
multiply by average forecast range of firm i in year t, where forecast range is the difference 
between upper bound and lower bound of management earnings forecast, deflated by stock 
price at fiscal year beginning; LEV is calculated as long-term debt divided by total assets; 
MTB is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market capitalization divided by book value of 
equity; ROA is measured as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; 
STDROA is the standard deviation of ROA for prior 5 years; LOGMCAP is calculated as 
natural log of market capitalization; DISP is analyst earnings forecast dispersion. Industry and 
year fixed effects are controlled for and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  




    
  
(-5.24) 




   
   
(-2.86) 
   
ACCURACY 
   
-0.525*** 
  




    
-0.533*** 
 




     
-2.437*** 
      
(-3.73) 
LEV 0.314*** 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.021 0.024* 0.028* 
 
(8.87) (6.90) (6.83) (1.39) (1.65) (1.80) 
MTB 0.017*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 
(12.42) (13.78) (13.80) (5.76) (5.85) (5.96) 
ROA -0.673*** -0.188*** -0.188*** -0.162*** -0.157*** -0.180*** 
 
(-25.04) (-11.53) (-11.55) (-5.09) (-4.85) (-5.51) 
STDROA 0.381*** 0.008** 0.008** 0.189*** 0.206*** 0.195*** 
 
(14.33) (2.29) (2.28) (7.05) (7.36) (7.42) 
LOGMCAP -0.314*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.034*** 
 
(-35.96) (-46.39) (-46.35) (-21.57) (-22.67) (-20.88) 
DISP 0.000*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.011* 0.018*** 0.026*** 
 
(7.15) (11.46) (11.54) (1.81) (3.03) (4.28) 
Constant 1.824*** 1.029*** 1.030*** 0.727*** 0.728*** 0.736*** 
 
(11.83) (34.74) (34.45) (3.65) (3.65) (3.72) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 52,077 52,077 52,077 10,202 10,202 10,226 
Adj.R
2







Table 5: Management forecast and risk parameter uncertainty – the conditional effect of firm’s information environment 
This table presents results of the association between management forecast properties and risk parameter uncertainty conditional on firms’ information 
environment. The dependent variable is VBETA, our proxy for risk parameter uncertainty, estimated from CAPM using weekly returns over year t+1. MF is 
an indicator variable that equals to 1 if firm i issued forecast in year t; otherwise zero; MF_FREQ is number of annual management earnings forecasts in 
year t. ACCURACY is average forecast accuracy for firm i in year t, where forecast accuracy is calculated as absolute value of the difference between actual 
EPS and forecast EPS, scaled by share price at fiscal year end; ACCURACY is average forecast accuracy for firm i in year t, where forecast accuracy is 
calculated as absolute value of the difference between actual EPS and forecast EPS, scaled by share price at fiscal year beginning; ACCURACY is 
multiplied by -1 to transform it in an increasing-in-quality measure; BIAS is average bias in management earnings forecasts for firm i in year t, where bias is 
measured as difference between actual EPS and forecasted EPS, scaled by share price at fiscal year beginning; PRECISION is -1 multiply by average 
forecast range of firm i in year t, where forecast range is the difference between upper bound and lower bound of management earnings forecast, deflated by 
stock price at fiscal year beginning; LEV is calculated as long-term debt divided by total assets; MTB is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market 
capitalization divided by book value of equity; ROA is measured as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; STDROA is the standard 
deviation of ROA for prior 5 years; LOGMCAP is calculated as natural log of market capitalization; DISP is analyst forecast dispersion. Panel A presents 
results of the effect of firm size on the association between management forecast properties and risk parameter uncertainty. The sample is partitioned into 
small and large size groups based on 30 Percentile and 70 Percentile of LOGMCAP. Panel B presents results of the effect of analyst following on the 
association between management forecast properties and risk parameter uncertainty. The sample is partitioned into low and high analyst following groups 
based upon 30 Percentile and 70 Percentile of analyst following. Panel C presents results of the association between management forecast properties and 
risk parameter uncertainty conditional on analyst forecast dispersion. High and low dispersion samples are identified based on 70 Percentile and 30 
Percentile of analyst forecast dispersion. Analyst following and analyst forecast dispersion are calculated using data from I/B/E/S. In all panels, year and 
industry fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Management forecast and risk parameter uncertainty – conditional on firm size 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Small Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small Large 
MF -0.017* -0.015*** 
        
 
(-1.71) (-5.81) 




      
   
(-1.84) (-5.17) 
      
ACCURACY 
    
-0.237*** -0.030* 
    
     
(-6.04) (-1.94) 
    
BIAS 
      
-0.238*** -0.079 
  




        
-1.831*** -0.611 








LEV 0.164*** -0.012 0.164*** -0.012 0.061*** -0.041*** 0.065*** -0.042*** 0.069*** -0.042*** 
 
(9.36) (-1.20) (9.36) (-1.20) (2.59) (-3.50) (2.71) (-3.53) (2.92) (-3.60) 
MTB -0.000 0.004*** -0.000 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.002*** 0.007*** 0.002*** 0.008*** 0.002*** 
 
(-0.80) (9.43) (-0.80) (9.42) (4.06) (2.86) (4.07) (2.87) (4.39) (2.92) 
ROA -0.163*** -0.152*** -0.163*** -0.152*** -0.242*** -0.135*** -0.244*** -0.134*** -0.291*** -0.134*** 
 
(-8.30) (-4.69) (-8.30) (-4.68) (-6.81) (-3.40) (-6.69) (-3.43) (-8.19) (-3.71) 
STDROA 0.006** 0.142*** 0.006** 0.143*** 0.241*** 0.283*** 0.253*** 0.285*** 0.247*** 0.284*** 
 
(2.29) (7.54) (2.30) (7.57) (6.80) (5.28) (7.09) (5.31) (6.94) (5.32) 
LOGMCAP -0.101*** -0.023*** -0.101*** -0.023*** -0.035*** -0.012*** -0.037*** -0.012*** -0.038*** -0.012*** 
 
(-21.90) (-20.38) (-21.91) (-20.27) (-6.22) (-5.83) (-6.55) (-5.75) (-6.51) (-5.79) 
DISP 0.019*** 0.009*** 0.019*** 0.009*** 0.048** 0.013** 0.064*** 0.015** 0.099*** 0.014** 
 
(7.91) (3.86) (7.92) (3.93) (2.32) (2.08) (3.07) (2.57) (5.07) (2.23) 
Constant 1.367*** 0.521*** 1.366*** 0.521*** 1.059*** 0.281*** 1.064*** 0.280*** 1.057*** 0.280*** 
 
(18.91) (14.96) (18.81) (14.78) (17.39) (13.48) (17.61) (13.33) (18.68) (13.47) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15,672 15,672 15,672 15,672 3,103 3,106 3,103 3,106 3,111 3,111 
Adj.R
2




























Panel B: Management forecast and risk parameter uncertainty – conditional on analyst following 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High 
MF -0.038*** -0.012*** 
        
 
(-5.86) (-3.53) 




      
   
(-6.00) (-1.56) 
      
ACCURACY 
    
-0.232*** -0.136** 
    
     
(-4.65) (-2.00) 
    
BIAS 
      
-0.254*** -0.202** 
  




        
-1.504** -0.722 
         
(-2.42) (-0.96) 
LEV 0.115*** 0.031** 0.115*** 0.031** 0.068*** -0.030 0.070*** -0.030* 0.073*** -0.029 
 
(7.85) (2.32) (7.82) (2.29) (3.34) (-1.64) (3.40) (-1.66) (3.59) (-1.56) 
MTB 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 
 
(7.30) (7.28) (7.29) (7.30) (3.93) (4.23) (3.93) (4.19) (4.33) (4.22) 
ROA -0.191*** -0.159*** -0.192*** -0.159*** -0.214*** -0.249*** -0.213*** -0.234*** -0.274*** -0.261*** 
 
(-10.07) (-7.22) (-10.10) (-7.22) (-5.37) (-5.14) (-5.51) (-4.92) (-6.74) (-5.46) 
STDROA 0.007** 0.012*** 0.007** 0.012*** 0.293*** 0.235*** 0.305*** 0.237*** 0.299*** 0.241*** 
 
(2.00) (3.10) (2.00) (3.09) (7.04) (4.93) (7.31) (4.92) (7.08) (5.13) 
LOGMCAP -0.062*** -0.042*** -0.062*** -0.043*** -0.046*** -0.023*** -0.047*** -0.022*** -0.048*** -0.023*** 
 
(-29.23) (-28.48) (-29.15) (-28.52) (-13.97) (-12.34) (-14.07) (-12.36) (-13.89) (-12.09) 
DISP 0.018*** 0.024*** 0.018*** 0.024*** 0.067*** 0.031** 0.074*** 0.041*** 0.103*** 0.057*** 
 
(7.87) (6.23) (7.91) (6.27) (3.46) (2.02) (3.85) (3.02) (5.32) (3.58) 
Constant 1.185*** 0.902*** 1.183*** 0.903*** 1.121*** 0.545*** 1.122*** 0.537*** 1.127*** 0.543*** 
 
(23.24) (23.09) (23.00) (23.22) (39.39) (6.56) (39.51) (6.46) (39.91) (6.52) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,498 15,522 16,498 15,522 3,106 3,104 3,106 3,104 3,111 3,112 





















Panel C: Management forecast and risk parameter uncertainty – conditional on analyst forecast dispersion 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low 
MF -0.013*** -0.004 
        
 
(-3.41) (-0.65) 




      
   
(-2.68) (-0.27) 
      
ACCURACY 
    
-0.158*** -0.213 
    
     
(-4.01) (-1.60) 
    
BIAS 
      
-0.229*** -0.022 
  




        
-1.424** -1.764 
         
(-2.31) (-1.58) 
LEV -0.023* 0.107*** -0.041*** 0.103*** 0.083*** -0.052*** 0.078*** -0.049*** 0.086*** -0.050*** 
 
(-1.88) (7.31) (-3.34) (6.97) (3.06) (-3.37) (2.80) (-3.08) (3.25) (-3.19) 
MTB 0.008*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.002 0.005*** 0.002 0.005*** 0.002 0.005*** 
 
(13.17) (4.32) (14.50) (4.42) (1.39) (6.14) (1.43) (6.15) (1.50) (6.16) 
ROA -0.220*** -0.169*** -0.222*** -0.170*** -0.285*** -0.167*** -0.255*** -0.183*** -0.341*** -0.167*** 
 
(-7.38) (-10.53) (-6.93) (-10.47) (-6.50) (-3.92) (-5.33) (-4.36) (-8.08) (-4.20) 
STDROA 0.029* 0.004*** 0.033* 0.004*** 0.237*** 0.290*** 0.241*** 0.290*** 0.245*** 0.286*** 
 
(1.87) (2.82) (1.87) (2.82) (5.03) (8.29) (5.11) (8.23) (5.36) (8.20) 
LOGMCAP -0.044*** -0.061*** -0.038*** -0.060*** -0.035*** -0.029*** -0.033*** -0.029*** -0.035*** -0.028*** 
 
(-29.94) (-35.28) (-27.36) (-34.92) (-11.24) (-18.48) (-11.40) (-17.92) (-11.75) (-17.53) 
DISP 0.443*** 0.012*** 0.303** 0.012*** 0.027** 0.546*** 0.033** 0.530*** 0.051*** 0.508*** 
 
(3.61) (7.75) (2.45) (7.84) (2.04) (3.76) (2.48) (3.61) (3.86) (3.58) 
Constant 0.895*** 1.299*** 0.893*** 1.301*** 0.407*** 0.887*** 0.389*** 0.898*** 0.406*** 0.884*** 
 
(25.48) (23.31) (25.43) (23.28) (5.56) (5.69) (5.33) (5.83) (5.44) (5.68) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15,641 15,673 15,641 15,673 3,105 3,106 3,105 3,106 3,112 3,112 
Adj.R
2



















Table 6: Management forecast and risk parameter uncertainty – the conditional effect of firm’s business uncertainty 
This table presents results of the association between management forecast properties and risk parameter uncertainty conditional on firms’ operating 
uncertainty. The dependent variable is VBETA, our proxy for risk parameter uncertainty, estimated from CAPM using weekly returns over year t+1. MF is 
an indicator variable that equals to 1 if firm i issued forecast in year t; otherwise zero; MF_FREQ is number of annual management earnings forecasts in 
year t. ACCURACY is average forecast accuracy for firm i in year t, where forecast accuracy is calculated as absolute value of the difference between actual 
EPS and forecast EPS, scaled by share price at fiscal year end; ACCURACY is average forecast accuracy for firm i in year t, where forecast accuracy is 
calculated as absolute value of the difference between actual EPS and forecast EPS, scaled by share price at fiscal year beginning; ACCURACY is 
multiplied by -1 to transform it in an increasing-in-quality measure; BIAS is average bias in management earnings forecasts for firm i in year t, where bias is 
measured as difference between actual EPS and forecasted EPS, scaled by share price at fiscal year beginning; PRECISION is -1 multiply by average 
forecast range of firm i in year t, where forecast range is the difference between upper bound and lower bound of management earnings forecast, deflated by 
stock price at fiscal year beginning; LEV is calculated as long-term debt divided by total assets; MTB is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market 
capitalization divided by book value of equity; ROA is measured as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; STDROA is the standard 
deviation of ROA for prior 5 years; LOGMCAP is calculated as natural log of market capitalization; DISP is analyst forecast dispersion. The sample is 
partitioned into high and low operating uncertainty groups based upon 70 Percentile and 30 Percentile of STDROA. Year and industry fixed effects are 
included and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low 
MF -0.015** -0.004 
        
 
(-2.00) (-1.49) 




      
   
(-2.75) (-0.63) 
      
ACCURACY 
    
-0.209*** -0.065 
    
     
(-5.31) (-0.67) 
    
BIAS 
      
-0.233*** -0.231 
  




        
-1.416*** -2.215* 
         
(-2.66) (-1.92) 
LEV 0.126*** 0.022** 0.127*** 0.022* 0.010 0.008 0.010 0.007 0.020 0.004 
 
(7.67) (1.99) (7.71) (1.95) (0.46) (0.51) (0.45) (0.48) (0.88) (0.29) 
MTB 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 
 







ROA -0.122*** -0.331*** -0.122*** -0.333*** -0.213*** -0.209*** -0.211*** -0.195*** -0.253*** -0.172** 
 
(-8.81) (-8.57) (-8.81) (-8.62) (-7.54) (-2.92) (-7.47) (-2.69) (-9.21) (-2.29) 
STDROA 0.088*** 1.507*** 0.088*** 1.519*** 0.199*** 1.278*** 0.207*** 1.298*** 0.203*** 1.177*** 
 
(6.93) (7.94) (6.93) (7.88) (6.60) (3.06) (6.73) (3.17) (6.64) (2.71) 
LOGMCAP -0.067*** -0.025*** -0.067*** -0.025*** -0.037*** -0.021*** -0.037*** -0.021*** -0.038*** -0.020*** 
 
(-29.90) (-27.19) (-29.88) (-27.22) (-13.48) (-13.49) (-14.04) (-13.74) (-14.11) (-13.74) 
DISP 0.000** -0.000 0.000** -0.000 0.021 0.058*** 0.033** 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.055*** 
 
(2.26) (-1.55) (2.27) (-1.51) (1.28) (3.95) (2.08) (4.42) (3.96) (4.02) 
Constant 1.468*** 0.694*** 1.466*** 0.695*** 0.444*** 0.325*** 0.439*** 0.319*** 0.446*** 0.306*** 
 
(17.67) (20.20) (17.56) (20.17) (7.55) (8.81) (7.50) (8.71) (7.65) (8.72) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15,652 15,675 15,652 15,675 3,089 3,107 3,089 3,107 3,107 3,107 
Adj.R
2




























Table 7: Management forecast and risk parameter uncertainty – the conditional effect of firm age 
This table presents results of the association between management forecast properties and risk parameter uncertainty conditional on firm age. The sample is 
partitioned into young and old groups based upon 70 Percentile and 30 Percentile of firm age. The dependent variable is VBETA, our proxy for risk 
parameter uncertainty, estimated from CAPM using weekly returns over year t+1. MF is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if firm i issued forecast in 
year t; otherwise zero; MF_FREQ is number of annual management earnings forecasts in year t. ACCURACY is average forecast accuracy for firm i in year 
t, where forecast accuracy is calculated as absolute value of the difference between actual EPS and forecast EPS, scaled by share price at fiscal year 
beginning; ACCURACY is multiplied by -1 to transform it in an increasing-in-quality measure; BIAS is average bias in management earnings forecasts for 
firm i in year t, where bias is measured as difference between actual EPS and forecasted EPS, scaled by share price at fiscal year beginning; PRECISION is 
-1 multiply by average forecast range of firm i in year t, where forecast range is the difference between upper bound and lower bound of management 
earnings forecast, deflated by stock price at fiscal year beginning; LEV is calculated as long-term debt divided by total assets; MTB is market-to-book ratio, 
calculated as market capitalization divided by book value of equity; ROA is measured as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; 
STDROA is the standard deviation of ROA for prior 5 years; LOGMCAP is calculated as natural log of market capitalization; DISP is analyst forecast 
dispersion. Year and industry fixed effects are included and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  Young Old Young Old Young Old Young Old Young Old 
MF -0.010 -0.006** 
        
 
(-1.60) (-1.97) 




      
   
(-1.82) (-2.45) 
      
ACCURACY 
    
-0.200*** -0.127** 
    
     
(-4.45) (-2.12) 
    
BIAS 
      
-0.206*** -0.162** 
  




        
-2.050*** -2.559*** 
         
(-3.16) (-3.68) 
LEV 0.034** 0.057*** 0.034** 0.056*** 0.006 0.028* 0.006 0.029* 0.008 0.025* 
 
(2.51) (4.62) (2.51) (4.57) (0.25) (1.93) (0.26) (1.94) (0.34) (1.70) 
MTB 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.002** 0.006*** 0.001* 0.006*** 0.002** 
 
(6.43) (6.50) (6.44) (6.28) (5.38) (2.00) (5.44) (1.93) (5.63) (2.33) 
ROA -0.313*** -0.352*** -0.313*** -0.372*** -0.234*** -0.082* -0.237*** -0.067 -0.260*** -0.064 
 







STDROA 0.095*** 0.007 0.095*** 0.007 0.217*** 0.227** 0.223*** 0.232** 0.221*** 0.204* 
 
(6.90) (1.37) (6.89) (1.35) (6.66) (2.00) (6.73) (2.06) (6.78) (1.80) 
LOGMCAP -0.050*** -0.030*** -0.050*** -0.029*** -0.031*** -0.018*** -0.032*** -0.018*** -0.030*** -0.017*** 
 
(-26.91) (-27.88) (-26.81) (-27.62) (-10.89) (-10.96) (-11.20) (-10.68) (-10.11) (-10.59) 
DISP 0.000*** 0.015*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.079*** 0.021 0.093*** 0.030*** 0.116*** 0.036*** 
 
(2.69) (4.98) (2.69) (8.18) (3.74) (1.45) (4.50) (2.59) (5.71) (2.73) 
Constant 1.153*** 0.605*** 1.153*** 0.606*** 0.769*** 0.480*** 0.772*** 0.470*** 0.765*** 0.456*** 
 
(28.31) (15.31) (28.14) (15.45) (3.46) (3.84) (3.47) (3.85) (3.44) (3.66) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15,655 15,647 15,655 15,647 3,096 3,103 3,096 3,103 3,106 3,107 
Adj.R
2



























Table 8: Management forecast and risk parameter uncertainty – the conditional effect of management forecast reliability 
This table presents results of the association between management forecast properties and risk parameter uncertainty conditional on management forecast 
reliability as measured by correlation between management forecast earnings and realized earnings. The sample is partitioned into high and low groups 
based upon 70 Percentile and 30 Percentile of the correlation between management forecast earnings and realized earnings, and the correlation is calculated 
by year.The dependent variable is VBETA, our proxy for risk parameter uncertainty, estimated from CAPM using weekly returns over year t+1. MF is an 
indicator variable that equals to 1 if firm i issued forecast in year t; otherwise zero; MF_FREQ is number of annual management earnings forecasts in year t. 
ACCURACY is average forecast accuracy for firm i in year t, where forecast accuracy is calculated as absolute value of the difference between actual EPS 
and forecast EPS, scaled by share price at fiscal year end; ACCURACY is average forecast accuracy for firm i in year t, where forecast accuracy is 
calculated as absolute value of the difference between actual EPS and forecast EPS, scaled by share price at fiscal year beginning; ACCURACY is 
multiplied by -1 to transform it in an increasing-in-quality measure; BIAS is average bias in management earnings forecasts for firm i in year t, where bias is 
measured as difference between actual EPS and forecasted EPS, scaled by share price at fiscal year beginning; PRECISION is -1 multiply by average 
forecast range of firm i in year t, where forecast range is the difference between upper bound and lower bound of management earnings forecast, deflated by 
stock price at fiscal year beginning; LEV is calculated as long-term debt divided by total assets; MTB is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market 
capitalization divided by book value of equity; ROA is measured as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; STDROA is the standard 
deviation of ROA for prior 5 years; LOGMCAP is calculated as natural log of market capitalization; DISP is analyst forecast dispersion. Year and industry 
fixed effects are included and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low 
MF -0.003 -0.002 
        
 
(-0.72) (-0.50) 




      
   
(2.90) (1.70) 
      
ACCURACY 
    
-0.303*** -0.142*** 
    
     
(-3.67) (-3.60) 
    
BIAS 
      
-0.376*** -0.161*** 
  




        
-0.486 -1.493*** 
         
(-0.56) (-3.11) 
LEV 0.081*** 0.047*** 0.080*** 0.047*** -0.035* 0.025* -0.029 0.025 -0.038* 0.027* 
 
(6.80) (3.50) (6.72) (3.46) (-1.76) (1.69) (-1.47) (1.64) (-1.85) (1.84) 
MTB 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
 







ROA -0.124*** -0.264*** -0.124*** -0.265*** -0.157*** -0.169*** -0.144** -0.168*** -0.216*** -0.191*** 
 
(-5.05) (-9.72) (-5.06) (-9.74) (-2.84) (-4.75) (-2.53) (-4.33) (-3.77) (-5.45) 
STDROA 0.008** 0.004*** 0.008** 0.004*** 0.336*** 0.223*** 0.352*** 0.226*** 0.354*** 0.228*** 
 
(2.47) (4.02) (2.47) (4.02) (6.98) (4.41) (7.11) (4.45) (7.03) (4.45) 
LOGMCAP -0.055*** -0.042*** -0.055*** -0.042*** -0.031*** -0.018*** -0.032*** -0.018*** -0.032*** -0.017*** 
 
(-34.89) (-25.80) (-34.91) (-25.87) (-15.00) (-12.30) (-15.30) (-12.34) (-14.16) (-11.60) 
DISP 0.028*** 0.011*** 0.028*** 0.011*** 0.045*** 0.035** 0.055*** 0.043*** 0.074*** 0.053*** 
 
(8.77) (4.56) (8.83) (4.59) (2.76) (2.57) (3.43) (3.35) (3.98) (4.18) 
Constant 1.058*** 0.460*** 1.062*** 0.462*** 0.672*** 0.258*** 0.666*** 0.256*** 0.681*** 0.251*** 
 
(24.65) (20.87) (25.13) (21.37) (4.36) (5.75) (4.30) (5.61) (4.45) (5.68) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17,347 13,050 17,347 13,050 2,662 2,757 2,662 2,757 2,663 2,763 
Adj.R
2




























Table 9: Management forecast and risk parameter uncertainty in pre- and post-Regulation Fair Disclosure periods 
This table reports results of the association between management forecast and risk parameter uncertainty in pre- and post-Regulation FD periods. Pre-period 
is from 1995 to 1999, and post-period is from 2001 to 2011. The dependent variable is VBETA, which is estimated from CAPM using weekly returns over 
year t+1. MF is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if firm i issued forecast in year t; otherwise zero; MF_FREQ is number of annual management 
earnings forecasts in year t. ACCURACY is average forecast accuracy for firm i in year t, where forecast accuracy is calculated as absolute value of the 
difference between actual EPS and forecast EPS, scaled by share price at fiscal year beginning; ACCURACY is multiplied by -1 to transform it in an 
increasing-in-quality measure; BIAS is average bias in management earnings forecasts for firm i in year t, where bias is measured as difference between 
actual EPS and forecasted EPS, scaled by share price at fiscal year beginning; PRECISION is -1 multiply by average forecast range of firm i in year t, 
where forecast range is the difference between upper bound and lower bound of management earnings forecast, deflated by stock price at fiscal year 
beginning; LEV is calculated as long-term debt divided by total assets; MTB is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market capitalization divided by book 
value of equity; ROA is measured as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; STDROA is the standard deviation of ROA for prior 5 years; 
LOGMCAP is calculated as natural log of market capitalization; DISP is analyst forecast dispersion. In each model, year and industry fixed effects are 
included. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  Pre-FD Post-FD Pre-FD Post-FD Pre-FD Post-FD Pre-FD Post-FD Pre-FD Post-FD 
MF 0.007 -0.018*** 
        
 
(1.02) (-5.79) 




      
   
(-2.82) (-4.22) 
      
ACCURACY 
    
-0.147 -0.575*** 
    
     
(-0.80) (-5.78) 
    
BIAS 
      
-0.148 -0.575*** 
  




        
3.280** -2.670*** 
         
(2.23) (-3.84) 
LEV 0.021 0.072*** 0.021 0.072*** 0.005** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 
 
(1.35) (7.40) (1.34) (7.37) (2.54) (4.63) (2.59) (4.69) (2.62) (4.74) 
MTB 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.004*** -0.032 0.031* -0.033 0.036** -0.033 0.038** 
 
(8.17) (8.43) (8.15) (8.45) (-0.68) (1.91) (-0.69) (2.20) (-0.68) (2.22) 
ROA -0.363*** -0.161*** -0.363*** -0.162*** -0.182* -0.160*** -0.183* -0.155*** -0.204** -0.179*** 
 







STDROA 0.002 0.015** 0.002 0.015** 0.322** 0.182*** 0.322** 0.201*** 0.317** 0.189*** 
 
(1.59) (2.56) (1.59) (2.58) (2.18) (6.78) (2.18) (7.08) (2.16) (7.16) 
LOGMCAP -0.059*** -0.049*** -0.059*** -0.049*** -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.037*** -0.035*** -0.037*** -0.035*** 
 
(-34.65) (-39.50) (-34.69) (-39.32) (-8.18) (-20.52) (-8.26) (-21.56) (-8.35) (-19.40) 
DISP 0.011*** 0.020*** 0.011*** 0.020*** 0.087*** 0.008 0.092*** 0.016*** 0.099*** 0.025*** 
 
(4.03) (9.68) (4.03) (9.75) (3.25) (1.33) (3.58) (2.61) (3.68) (3.89) 
Constant 1.061*** 0.437*** 1.062*** 0.436*** 0.812*** 0.306*** 0.811*** 0.316*** 0.828*** 0.317*** 
 
(29.32) (16.05) (29.67) (15.41) (4.01) (7.17) (4.01) (7.21) (4.12) (6.66) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14,176 34,761 14,176 34,761 977 8,823 977 8,823 980 8,841 
Adj.R
2





















Table 10: Management forecast and risk parameter uncertainty – change 
specification  
This table reports the association between management forecast and risk parameter 
uncertainty in change specification. The dependent variable, ∆VBETA, is the change in risk 
parameter uncertainty over two consecutive years; ∆MF_FREQ is the change in management 
forecast frequency over two consecutive years; ∆ACCURACY is the change in management 
forecast accuracy over two consecutive years; ∆BIAS is the change in management forecast 
bias over two consecutive years; ∆PRECISION is the change in management forecast 
precision over two consecutive years; ∆LEV is the change in leverage ratio over two years; 
∆MTB is the change in market-to-book ratio over two years; ∆ROA is the change in ROA over 
two consecutive years; ∆STDROA is the change in STDROA over two consecutive years; 
∆LOGMCAP is the change in log of market capitalization over two consecutive years; ∆DISP 
is the change in analyst forecast dispersion from year t-1 to t+1. Standard errors are clustered 
at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
∆MF_FREQ -0.003*** 
   
 
(-4.74) 
















   
-0.888* 
    
(-1.90) 
∆LEV 0.068*** -0.025 -0.025 -0.023 
 
(4.13) (-1.21) (-1.21) (-1.10) 
∆MTB 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(1.28) (0.28) (0.17) (0.45) 
∆ROA -0.060*** -0.002 0.004 -0.027 
 
(-4.26) (-0.06) (0.13) (-0.79) 
∆STDROA 0.253*** 0.358*** 0.361*** 0.392*** 
 
(6.65) (4.39) (4.44) (4.85) 
∆LOGMCAP -0.021*** -0.007 -0.007 -0.009* 
 
(-7.07) (-1.41) (-1.53) (-1.81) 
∆DISP -0.000 -0.036*** -0.038*** -0.036*** 
 
(-0.01) (-3.29) (-3.59) (-3.33) 
Constant -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007*** 
 
(-12.51) (-7.61) (-7.57) (-6.80) 
Observations 41,922 6,820 6,820 6,829 
Adj.R
2










Table 11: Management forecast and risk parameter uncertainty – CEO 
turnover sample  
This table presents results of the association between changes in management forecasts and 
changes in risk parameter uncertainty for a sample of firm-year that experience CEO turnover. 
CEO turnover years are obtained from Execucomp, and sample period is from 1995 to 2011. 
The dependent variable, ∆VBETA, is the change in risk parameter uncertainty from year t-1 to 
t+1, where year t is the CEO turnover year identified from Execucomp. ∆MF_FREQ is the 
change in management forecast frequency from year t-1 to t+1; ∆ACCURACY is the change in 
management forecast accuracy from year t-1 to t+1; ∆BIAS is the change in management 
forecast bias from year t-1 to t+1; ∆PRECISION is the change in management forecast 
precision from year t-1 to t+1; ∆LEV is the change in leverage ratio from year t-1 to t+1; 
∆MTB is the change in market-to-book ratio from year t-1 to t+1; ∆ROA is the change in ROA 
from year t-1 to t+1; ∆STDROA is the change in STDROA from year t-1 to t+1; ∆LOGMCAP 
is the change in log of market capitalization from year t-1 to t+1; ∆DISP is the change in 
analyst forecast dispersion from year t-1 to t+1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
∆MF_FREQ -0.002 
   
 
(-1.15) 
















   
-1.977* 
    
(-1.65) 
∆LEV 0.002 0.061 0.067 0.044 
 
(0.04) (1.27) (1.39) (1.01) 
∆MTB 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.84) (1.49) (1.48) (1.57) 
∆ROA 0.003 0.138 0.162 0.008 
 
(0.03) (0.89) (1.05) (0.09) 
∆STDROA 0.261 0.329 0.285 0.182 
 
(0.74) (1.04) (0.86) (0.96) 
∆LOGMCAP 0.001 0.007 0.005 0.007 
 
(0.07) (0.56) (0.42) (0.62) 
∆DISP 0.036*** -0.013 -0.019 -0.009 
 
(2.71) (-0.96) (-1.24) (-0.72) 
Constant -0.025*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.020*** 
 
(-4.26) (-4.34) (-4.27) (-4.83) 
Observations 609 553 553 550 
Adj.R
2









Table 12: Test of Feedback Loop 
This table examines the existence of feedback loop between management forecast and risk 
parameter uncertainty. We test the feedback loop by estimating the follow regression. 
MEFi,t = a0 + b1VBETAi,t+1 + b2VBETAi,t + b3VBETAi,t-1 + ei,t 
The dependent variable is MEFi,t, and independent variables are VBETA of firm i in year t-1, t, 
and t+1. Year and industry fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (4) (5) (6) 
  MF MF_FREQ ACCURACY BIAS PRECISION 
VBETAt+1 -0.916*** -0.426*** -0.203*** -0.168*** -0.010*** 
 
(-9.23) (-13.97) (-10.15) (-9.55) (-9.60) 
VBETAt -1.028*** -0.606*** -0.172*** -0.155*** -0.009*** 
 
(-9.91) (-18.47) (-8.00) (-8.31) (-9.13) 
VBETAt-1 -1.641*** -0.534*** 0.014 0.035** -0.002** 
 
(-13.71) (-18.47) (0.75) (2.27) (-2.06) 
Constant -1.212*** 1.186* 0.093*** 0.072*** 0.005** 
 
(-2.70) (1.77) (5.47) (4.54) (2.51) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 44,121 44,151 9,423 9,423 9,445 
Adj.R
2





















Table 13: Heckman two-stage regressions for selection bias concern 
This table presents the results of Heckman two-stage regressions to deal with selection bias 
concern. In the first stage, we estimate the decision to issue management earnings forecast as a 
function of several determinants and calculate the inverse Mills ratio from the following probit 
model. 
Pr(MFi,t+1=1) = a0 + b1 MTBi,t + b2 LEVi,t + b3 ROAi,t + b4 STDROAi,t                   
+ b5 LOGMCAPi,t + b6 Log(ANAFOLLOW) i,t + b7 DISPi,t            
+ b8 LITIGATIONi,t + ei,t 
In the second, we include the estimated inverse Mills ratio (InvMills) in our main regression 
and examine the impact of management earnings forecast on risk parameter uncertainty.  
VBETAi,t+1 = a0 + b1 MEFi,t + b2 LEVi,t + b3 MTBi,t + b4 ROAi,t  + b5 STDROAi,t         
+ b6 LOGMCAPi,t + b7 DISPi,t  + b8InvMillsi,t + ei,t 
Year and industry fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, 
**, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: First-stage regression results 




























Year effect Yes 













Panel B: Second-stage regression results  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
MF -0.009*** 
    
 
(-3.21) 




   
  
(-1.81) 









   
-0.533*** 
 




    
-2.540*** 
     
(-3.89) 
LEV 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.020 0.024 0.027* 
 
(10.67) (10.67) (1.37) (1.65) (1.78) 
MTB 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
(10.19) (10.18) (6.12) (6.08) (6.26) 
ROA -0.135*** -0.134*** -0.166*** -0.161*** -0.184*** 
 
(-8.69) (-8.68) (-5.10) (-4.84) (-5.50) 
STDROA 0.004** 0.004** 0.195*** 0.210*** 0.200*** 
 
(2.33) (2.33) (7.27) (7.52) (7.62) 
LOGMCAP -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.036*** 
 
(-25.81) (-25.72) (-19.47) (-19.87) (-19.14) 
DISP 0.001 0.001 0.012** 0.019*** 0.028*** 
 
(0.70) (0.67) (2.02) (3.16) (4.43) 
InvMills 0.128*** 0.129*** -0.037*** -0.026* -0.031** 
 
(12.88) (13.00) (-2.67) (-1.85) (-2.22) 
Constant 0.583*** 0.581*** 0.819*** 0.793*** 0.814*** 
 
(13.53) (13.44) (4.00) (3.89) (4.01) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 52,077 52,077 10,202 10,202 10,226 
Adj.R
2














Table 14: Alternative proxies for risk parameter uncertainty 
This table presents results of the association between management forecast and estimation risk 
using alternative proxies for risk parameter uncertainty. The sample covers period from 1995 
to 2011. In Panel A, the dependent variable, VBETA_VAR, is calculated as the squared term of 
standard deviation of beta estimates, where beta is estimated 30 times from CAPM model 
using 30 randomly selected weekly returns for firm i in year t; In Panel B, the dependent 
variable, VBETA_SMB, is estimated as squared term of standard error of beta based on size 
factor from Fama-French 3-factor model; In Panel C, the dependent variable, VBETA_HML, is 
estimated as squared term of standard error of beta based on growth factor from Fama-French 
3-factor model. MF is an indicator variable that equals to one if a firm issued at least one 
annual management earnings forecast in year t. MF is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if 
firm i issued forecast in year t; otherwise zero; MF_FREQ is number of annual management 
earnings forecasts in year t. ACCURACY is average forecast accuracy for firm i in year t, 
where forecast accuracy is calculated as absolute value of the difference between actual EPS 
and forecast EPS, scaled by share price at fiscal year beginning; ACCURACY is multiplied by 
-1 to transform it in an increasing-in-quality measure; BIAS is average bias in management 
earnings forecasts for firm i in year t, where bias is measured as difference between actual 
EPS and forecasted EPS, scaled by share price at fiscal year beginning; PRECISION is -1 
multiply by average forecast range of firm i in year t, where forecast range is the difference 
between upper bound and lower bound of management earnings forecast, deflated by stock 
price at fiscal year beginning; LEV is calculated as long-term debt divided by total assets; 
MTB is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market capitalization divided by book value of 
equity; ROA is measured as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; 
STDROA is the standard deviation of ROA for prior 5 years; LOGMCAP is calculated as 
natural log of market capitalization; DISP is analyst forecast dispersion. Year and industry 
fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Alternative beta-based risk parameter uncertainty measure  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
MF -0.015*** 
    
 
(-5.60) 




   
  
(-3.49) 









   
-0.117*** 
 




    
-1.563*** 
     
(-4.16) 
LEV 0.060*** 0.060*** -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 
 
(7.72) (7.67) (-0.41) (-0.33) (-0.49) 
MTB 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
(11.70) (11.72) (5.87) (5.88) (6.14) 
ROA -0.106*** -0.107*** -0.177*** -0.181*** -0.190*** 
 
(-9.71) (-9.73) (-7.17) (-7.20) (-7.77) 
STDROA 0.157*** 0.158*** 0.238*** 0.242*** 0.242*** 
 
(14.15) (14.22) (9.05) (9.20) (9.17) 
LOGMCAP -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.023*** 
 
(-45.41) (-45.30) (-20.48) (-20.58) (-19.74) 
DISP 0.000** 0.000** 0.047*** 0.057*** 0.061*** 
 





Constant 0.779*** 0.780*** 0.491*** 0.490*** 0.483*** 
 
(31.05) (30.71) (3.97) (3.96) (3.90) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 52,037 52,037 10,316 10,316 10,337 
Adj.R
2































Panel B: Size-factor-based risk parameter uncertainty 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
MF -0.053*** 
    
 
(-5.10) 




   
  
(-4.07) 









   
-1.164*** 
 




    
-13.580*** 
     
(-8.26) 
LEV 0.273*** 0.272*** 0.002 0.006 -0.007 
 
(8.58) (8.55) (0.04) (0.13) (-0.17) 
MTB 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 
 
(10.01) (10.01) (7.89) (7.85) (8.40) 
ROA -1.365*** -1.368*** -0.920*** -0.886*** -0.999*** 
 
(-34.37) (-34.47) (-8.75) (-8.39) (-10.01) 
STDROA 0.584*** 0.586*** 1.068*** 1.103*** 1.077*** 
 
(13.81) (13.85) (10.71) (10.85) (10.57) 
LOGMCAP -0.176*** -0.176*** -0.127*** -0.127*** -0.119*** 
 
(-51.89) (-51.72) (-25.53) (-26.34) (-24.26) 
DISP 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.174*** 0.227*** 0.291*** 
 
(10.14) (10.20) (4.31) (5.63) (7.25) 
Constant 2.435*** 2.436*** 1.760*** 1.741*** 1.694*** 
 
(24.89) (24.53) (5.33) (5.24) (5.03) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 52,077 52,077 10,202 10,202 10,226 
Adj.R
2
















Panel C: Book-to-market-factor-based risk parameter uncertainty 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
MF -0.031* 
    
 
(-1.78) 




   
  
(0.73) 









   
-1.452*** 
 




    
-12.688*** 
     
(-5.14) 
LEV 0.301*** 0.298*** 0.002 0.006 0.002 
 
(5.58) (5.51) (0.02) (0.09) (0.03) 
MTB 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.029*** 
 
(12.51) (12.53) (7.36) (7.34) (7.73) 
ROA -2.447*** -2.453*** -1.434*** -1.386*** -1.602*** 
 
(-38.26) (-38.39) (-9.00) (-8.58) (-10.39) 
STDROA 0.048*** 0.048*** 1.704*** 1.747*** 1.714*** 
 
(3.75) (3.73) (11.22) (11.32) (11.02) 
LOGMCAP -0.300*** -0.302*** -0.183*** -0.183*** -0.179*** 
 
(-52.66) (-52.53) (-24.79) (-25.60) (-23.74) 
DISP 0.098*** 0.311*** 0.301*** 0.363*** 0.465*** 
 
(10.09) (10.55) (5.04) (6.23) (7.49) 
Constant 2.947*** 2.956*** 2.087*** 2.062*** 2.044*** 
 
(18.49) (18.63) (6.83) (6.69) (6.60) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 52,077 52,077 10,202 10,202 10,226 
Adj.R
2
















Table 15: Alternative proxy for management forecast frequency 
This table presents the results of the association between management forecast frequency and 
risk parameter uncertainty using alternative forecast frequency proxy, FREQ_RATIO, which is 
calculated as the number of annual forecast firm i issued in year t divided by average forecast 
frequency over the prior 3 years. The dependent variable is VBETA, which is estimated from 
CAPM using weekly returns over year t+1. MTB is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market 
capitalization divided by book value of equity; ROA is measured as income before 
extraordinary items divided by total assets; STDROA is the standard deviation of ROA for 
prior 5 years; LOGMCAP is calculated as natural log of market capitalization; DISP is analyst 
forecast dispersion. Year and industry fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered 
at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 

























Year effect Yes 



















Table 16: Missing management forecast and risk parameter uncertainty 
This table presents the results of the association between missing management forecast and 
risk parameter uncertainty. The sample covers period from 1995 to 2011. The dependent 
variable is VBETA, which is estimated from CAPM using weekly returns over year t+1. MISS 
is an indicator variable that equals to one if the actual earning is lower than management 
forecast earnings in year t, otherwise zero; LEV is calculated as long-term debt divided by 
total assets; MTB is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market capitalization divided by book 
value of equity; ROA is measured as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; 
STDROA is the standard deviation of ROA for prior 5 years; LOGMCAP is calculated as 
natural log of market capitalization; DISP is analyst forecast dispersion. Year and industry 
fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 

























Year effect Yes 



















Table 17: Management forecast and risk parameter uncertainty based on 
truncated model and tobit model 
This table presents the results of the association between management forecast and risk 
parameter uncertainty estimated from different regression models. Panel A reports the results 
from truncated regression, and Panel B reports results from tobit regression model. The 
dependent variable is VBETA, which is estimated from CAPM using weekly returns over year 
t+1. MF is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if firm i issued forecast in year t; otherwise 
zero; MF_FREQ is number of annual management earnings forecasts in year t. ACCURACY is 
average forecast accuracy for firm i in year t, where forecast accuracy is calculated as absolute 
value of the difference between actual EPS and forecast EPS, scaled by share price at fiscal 
year beginning; ACCURACY is multiplied by -1 to transform it in an increasing-in-quality 
measure; BIAS is average bias in management earnings forecasts for firm i in year t, where 
bias is measured as difference between actual EPS and forecasted EPS, scaled by share price 
at fiscal year beginning; PRECISION is -1 multiply by average forecast range of firm i in year 
t, where forecast range is the difference between upper bound and lower bound of 
management earnings forecast, deflated by stock price at fiscal year beginning; LEV is 
calculated as long-term debt divided by total assets; MTB is market-to-book ratio, calculated 
as market capitalization divided by book value of equity; ROA is measured as income before 
extraordinary items divided by total assets; STDROA is the standard deviation of ROA for 
prior 5 years; LOGMCAP is calculated as natural log of market capitalization; DISP is analyst 
forecast dispersion. Year and industry fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered 
at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Management forecast and risk parameter uncertainty based on 
truncated regression 




    
  
(-8.05) 




   
   
(-10.98) 
   
ACCURACY 
   
-0.177*** 
  




    
-0.172** 
 




     
-3.256*** 
      
(-3.39) 
LEV 0.314*** 0.320*** 0.313*** 0.032 0.034 0.031 
 
(8.87) (9.08) (8.56) (0.56) (0.60) (0.57) 
MTB 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.026*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 
(12.42) (12.28) (14.64) (7.85) (7.83) (7.99) 
ROA -0.673*** -0.662*** -0.321*** -0.430*** -0.435*** -0.446*** 
 
(-25.04) (-24.68) (-9.05) (-7.47) (-7.37) (-7.99) 
STDROA 0.381*** 0.374*** 0.009* 0.488*** 0.495*** 0.489*** 
 
(14.33) (14.10) (1.78) (9.22) (9.34) (9.24) 
LOGMCAP -0.314*** -0.308*** -0.384*** -0.174*** -0.175*** -0.171*** 
 
(-35.96) (-35.69) (-29.79) (-17.57) (-17.41) (-17.29) 
DISP 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.173*** 0.189*** 0.200*** 
 
(7.15) (7.05) (5.75) (5.78) (6.60) (7.05) 
Constant 1.824*** 1.806*** 2.190*** 1.436*** 1.438*** 1.409*** 
 
(11.83) (11.97) (12.82) (9.64) (9.61) (9.58) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Panel B: Management forecast and risk parameter uncertainty based on tobit 
regression 




    
  
(-2.78) 




   
   
(-2.82) 
   
ACCURACY 
   
-0.349*** 
  




    
-0.247*** 
 




     
-1.925*** 
      
(-4.97) 
LEV 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.048** 0.003 0.002 
 
(10.90) (10.87) (13.94) (1.97) (0.20) (0.15) 
MTB 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.055*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
(7.17) (7.23) (6.94) (3.83) (6.96) (7.37) 
ROA -0.330*** -0.329*** -0.200*** -0.317*** -0.197*** -0.237*** 
 
(-32.84) (-32.68) (-11.77) (-5.64) (-8.00) (-9.79) 
STDROA 0.156*** 0.155*** 0.008** 0.335*** 0.300*** 0.296*** 
 
(14.49) (14.43) (2.23) (8.42) (11.52) (11.33) 
LOGMCAP -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.052*** -0.031*** -0.029*** -0.028*** 
 
(-50.83) (-50.22) (-44.94) (-14.50) (-24.65) (-23.29) 
DISP 0.000** 0.000** 0.000* 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.073*** 
 
(2.20) (2.19) (1.93) (2.91) (5.92) (7.45) 
Constant 0.983*** 0.982*** 1.039*** 0.712*** 0.640*** 0.639*** 
 
(35.90) (35.79) (34.33) (3.41) (4.29) (4.28) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 

















Table 18: Management forecast and risk parameter uncertainty based on 
I/B/E/S guidance data 
This table presents the results of the association between management forecast and risk 
parameter uncertainty based on I/B/E/S guidance data. The sample ranges from 1995 to 2015. 
The dependent variable is VBETA, our proxy for risk parameter uncertainty, estimated from 
CAPM using weekly returns over year t+1. MF is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if firm 
i issued forecast in year t; otherwise zero; MF_FREQ is the number of annual management 
forecast firm i issued in year t; ACCURACY is average forecast accuracy for firm i in year t, 
where forecast accuracy is calculated as absolute value of the difference between actual EPS 
and forecast EPS, scaled by share price at fiscal year beginning; ACCURACY is multiplied by 
-1 to transform it in an increasing-in-quality measure; BIAS is average bias in management 
earnings forecasts for firm i in year t, where bias is measured as difference between actual 
EPS and forecasted EPS, scaled by share price at fiscal year beginning; PRECISION is -1 
multiply by average forecast range of firm i in year t, where forecast range is the difference 
between upper bound and lower bound of management earnings forecast, deflated by stock 
price at fiscal year beginning; LEV is calculated as long-term debt divided by total assets; 
MTB is market-to-book ratio, calculated as market capitalization divided by book value of 
equity; ROA is measured as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; 
STDROA is the standard deviation of ROA for prior 5 years; LOGMCAP is calculated as 
natural log of market capitalization; DISP is analyst earnings forecast dispersion. Industry and 
year fixed effects are controlled for and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, 
*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
MF -0.010*** 
    
 
(-3.30) 




   
  
(-2.76) 









   
-0.157*** 
 




    
-1.371*** 
     
(-5.85) 
LEV 0.097*** 0.083*** 0.015 0.027** 0.014 
 
(9.73) (8.32) (1.12) (2.03) (1.08) 
MTB 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 
(9.60) (11.45) (5.95) (5.34) (6.01) 
ROA -0.184*** -0.232*** -0.234*** -0.228*** -0.269*** 
 
(-9.95) (-12.31) (-8.47) (-7.81) (-9.38) 
STDROA 0.178*** 0.005** 0.240*** 0.244*** 0.242*** 
 
(13.26) (1.96) (9.08) (9.12) (9.02) 
LOGMCAP -0.053*** -0.056*** -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.032*** 
 
(-45.15) (-44.24) (-23.86) (-24.11) (-23.14) 
DISP 0.027*** 0.028*** -0.002 0.016*** 0.008 
 
(10.52) (11.06) (-0.27) (3.23) (1.45) 
Constant 1.150*** 1.179*** 0.783*** 0.794*** 0.785*** 
 
(27.24) (27.48) (4.15) (4.34) (4.19) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 65,836 65,836 12,319 12,319 12,366 
Adj.R
2






Table 19: Risk parameter uncertainty estimated by excluding weekly 
returns around earnings announcements 
This table presents robustness test results of the impact of management forecast on risk 
parameter uncertainty, where risk parameter uncertainty is estimated using weekly returns that 
do not fall in earnings announcement weeks. MF is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if 
firm i issued forecast in year t; otherwise zero; MF_FREQ is the number of annual 
management forecast firm i issued in year t; ACCURACY is average forecast accuracy for firm 
i in year t, where forecast accuracy is calculated as absolute value of the difference between 
actual EPS and forecast EPS, scaled by share price at fiscal year beginning; ACCURACY is 
multiplied by -1 to transform it in an increasing-in-quality measure; BIAS is average bias in 
management earnings forecasts for firm i in year t, where bias is measured as difference 
between actual EPS and forecasted EPS, scaled by share price at fiscal year beginning; 
PRECISION is -1 multiply by average forecast range of firm i in year t, where forecast range 
is the difference between upper bound and lower bound of management earnings forecast, 
deflated by stock price at fiscal year beginning. Other variable definitions are provided in 
the Appendix. Industry and year fixed effects are controlled for and standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
MF -0.020*** 
    
 
(-7.00) 




   
  
(-4.19) 









   
-0.210*** 
 




    
-1.812*** 
     
(-4.88) 
LEV 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 
(5.96) (5.88) (0.14) (0.20) (0.12) 
MTB 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
(13.51) (13.54) (6.95) (6.92) (7.31) 
ROA -0.189*** -0.189*** -0.238*** -0.231*** -0.263*** 
 
(-10.83) (-10.85) (-10.03) (-9.68) (-11.32) 
STDROA 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.269*** 0.275*** 0.272*** 
 
(2.64) (2.64) (11.48) (11.61) (11.41) 
LOGMCAP -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027*** 
 
(-43.91) (-43.88) (-23.37) (-23.99) (-22.59) 
DISP 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.047*** 0.057*** 0.072*** 
 
(10.87) (10.95) (5.29) (6.55) (7.68) 
Constant 1.034*** 1.035*** 0.619*** 0.616*** 0.613*** 
 
(33.95) (33.50) (4.22) (4.18) (4.16) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 49,093 49,093 10,151 10,151 10,175 
Adj.R
2






Table 20: Management forecast properties calculated using both annual 
and quarterly management earnings forecasts 
This table presents results of the impact of management forecast on risk parameter 
uncertainty, where management forecast properties are calculated using both annual 
and quarterly management earnings forecast. The dependent variable is VBETA, 
which is our proxy for risk parameter uncertainty. MF is an indicator variable that equals 
to 1 if firm i issued either annual forecast or quarterly forecast in year t; otherwise zero; 
MF_FREQ is the number of annual and quarterly management forecast firm i issued in year t; 
ACCURACY is average forecast accuracy for firm i in year t, where forecast accuracy is 
calculated as absolute value of the difference between actual EPS and forecast EPS, scaled by 
share price at fiscal period beginning; ACCURACY is multiplied by -1 to transform it in an 
increasing-in-quality measure; BIAS is average bias in management earnings forecasts for firm 
i in year t, where bias is measured as difference between actual EPS and forecasted EPS, 
scaled by share price at fiscal period beginning; PRECISION is -1 multiply by average 
forecast range of firm i in year t, where forecast range is the difference between upper bound 
and lower bound of management earnings forecast, deflated by stock price at fiscal period 
beginning. Other variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. Industry and year 
fixed effects are controlled for and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
MF -0.008*** 
    
 
(-3.05) 




   
  
(-4.82) 









   
-0.480*** 
 




    
-3.236*** 
     
(-5.68) 
LEV 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.013 0.018 0.020 
 
(6.80) (6.84) (0.96) (1.24) (1.45) 
MTB 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
(13.81) (13.80) (7.64) (7.63) (7.93) 
ROA -0.188*** -0.188*** -0.219*** -0.224*** -0.242*** 
 
(-11.54) (-11.54) (-9.91) (-10.12) (-11.04) 
STDROA 0.008** 0.008** 0.231*** 0.240*** 0.231*** 
 
(2.29) (2.29) (10.57) (10.63) (10.38) 
LOGMCAP -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.033*** 
 
(-46.54) (-46.11) (-25.77) (-26.61) (-24.89) 
DISP 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.023*** 0.032*** 
 
(11.47) (11.47) (3.96) (4.97) (7.25) 
Constant 1.030*** 1.028*** 0.912*** 0.914*** 0.903*** 
 
(34.80) (34.02) (7.71) (7.74) (7.62) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 52,077 52,077 15,032 15,032 15,106 
Adj.R
2







Table 21: Management forecast accuracy and bias estimated with open-
ended forecast included 
This table reports the impact of management forecast accuracy and forecast bias on 
risk parameter uncertainty, where open-ended forecasts are included in calculation of 
management forecast accuracy and management forecast bias. For open-ended 
forecasts, we use the minimum or maximum value of the forecast as the management 
forecast value. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. Industry and year 
fixed effects are controlled for and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 











LEV 0.018 0.021 
 
(1.07) (1.27) 
MTB 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
(6.12) (6.16) 
ROA -0.270*** -0.265*** 
 
(-8.79) (-8.46) 
STDROA 0.231*** 0.246*** 
 
(8.48) (8.70) 
LOGMCAP -0.031*** -0.031*** 
 
(-21.50) (-22.46) 
DISP 0.013*** 0.019*** 
 
(2.59) (3.80) 
Constant 0.729*** 0.728*** 
 
(5.43) (5.46) 
Year effect Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes 
Observations 10,541 10,541 
Adj.R
2













Table 22: Management forecast accuracy and bias calculated using the 
upper bound of management forecast 
This table presents the robustness test results of the impact of management forecast 
accuracy and management forecast bias on risk parameter uncertainty. Management 
forecast accuracy and bias are calculated using the upper bound of management 
forecast instead of the midpoint if the management forecast is a range forecast. Other 
variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. Industry and year fixed effects are 
controlled for and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 











LEV 0.019 0.023 
 
(1.12) (1.31) 
MTB 0.003*** 0.004*** 
 
(5.91) (5.98) 
ROA -0.265*** -0.264*** 
 
(-8.44) (-8.22) 
STDROA 0.233*** 0.247*** 
 
(8.32) (8.47) 
LOGMCAP -0.031*** -0.032*** 
 
(-21.20) (-22.12) 
DISP 0.012** 0.018*** 
 
(2.35) (3.59) 
Constant 0.717*** 0.719*** 
 
(3.55) (3.56) 
Year effect Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes 
Observations 10,202 10,202 
Adj.R
2
 0.36 0.36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
